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INDIANS AND TAXATION IN CANADA
Richard H. Bartlett*
A History
Canadian Indian Legislation and Policy
Canadian Indian policy as contained in the Indian Act of
Canada, has been described as possessing two components: (1)
"'civilizing' the Indian population and achieving assimilation and
integration as soon as possible," and (2) "protection of the In-
dians and their land from abuse and imposition until such time,
as being 'civilized,' such protection was superfluous." ' Such a
protection from "abuse and imposition" was considered to re-
quire an exemption from taxation of Indians and their lands. In
1850 the Province of Canada passed "An Act for the protection
of Indians in Upper Canada from imposition, and the property
occupied or enjoyed by them from trespass and injury." Section
4 provided:
That no taxes shall be levied or assessed upon any Indian or
any person inter-married with any Indian for or in respect of
any of the said Indian lands, nor shall any taxes or assessments
whatsoever be levied or imposed upon any Indian or any per-
son inter-married with any Indian so long as he, she or they
shall reside on Indian lands not ceded to the Crown, or which
having been so ceded may have been again set apart by the
Crown for the occupation of Indians.2
The 1857 "Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of In-
dian Tribes'"3 afforded an explicit statement of the policy of
assimilation in providing for the enfranchisement of Indians of a
"sufficiently advanced" education or "sufficiently intelligent to
be capable of managing their own affairs." Enfranchisement
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removed the disabilities and distinctions imposed upon the Indian
people for their protection. In particular, Section 14 provided:
Lands allotted under this Act to an Indian enfranchised under
it shall be liable to taxes and all other obligations and duties
under the municipal and school laws of the section of the Pro-
vAice in which such land is situated, as he shall also be in
respect of them and of his other property.
The exemption from taxation declared in the 1850 statute re-
mained unchanged until the first consolidation of Canadian In-
dian legislation provided in the Indian Act of 1876. 4 It appears
that until that time the exemption from taxation outside Upper
Canada was assumed, rather than declared, to apply. The need
for a consolidation of Indian legislation became apparent with
the settlement of the Northwest Territories and the establishment
of treaty relations with Indians inhabiting the area.' The 1876 Act
did not contain substantial changes from previously established
legislative policy, but the ambit of the exemption from taxation
was altered. Sections 64 and 65 provided:
64. No Indian or non-treaty Indian shall be liable to be
taxed for any real or personal property, unless he holds real
estate under lease or in fee simple, or personal property, out-
side of the reserve or special reserve, in which case he shall be
liable to be taxed for such real or personal property at the same
rate as other persons in the locality in which it is situated.
65. All land vested in the Crown, or in any person or body
corporate, in trust for or for the use of any Indian or non-
treaty Indian, or any band or irregular band of Indians or non-
treaty Indians shall be exempt from taxation.
Section 88 declared that upon enfranchisement "the provisions of
this Act and of any Act or law making any distinction between
the legal rights, privileges, disabilities and liabilities of Indians
and those of Her Majesty's other subjects shall cease to apply."
The exemption from taxation contained in the Indian Act of 1876
is significantly different from that of the legislation of 1850. The
1850 statute ruled out taxation upon Indian lands and Indians
resident thereon. The 1876 statute confined the exemption to real
or personal property of an Indian situated on a reserve and did
4. S.C. 1876 c. 18.
5. Annual Report of Department of Interior, 1876, Sessional Paper No. 9.
[Vol. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss2/2
INDIANS AND TAXATION
not extend to the person. The exemption remained almost
unaltered until 1951.6 The only two changes in that entire period
consisted of an amendment in 1884 that sought to continue the
exemption on lands allotted to enfranchised Indians until
declared taxable by proclamation,7 and an amendment in 1888
that clarified the liability to taxation of surrendered lands.8
In 1951 the exemption was rewritten9 in the following form,
now embodied in Section 87 of the Indian Act:
87. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act of the Parliament of
Canada or any Act of the legislature of a province, but subject
to subsection (2) and to section 83, the following property is
exempt from taxation, namely,
(a) the interest of an Indian or a band in reserve or sur-
rendered lands, and
(b) the personal property of an Indian or band situated on a
reserve,
and no Indian or band is subject to taxation in respect of the
ownership, occupation, possession or use of any property men-
tioned in paragraph (a) or (b) or is otherwise subject to taxa-
tion in respect of any such property; and no succession duty,
inheritance tax or estate duty is payable on the death of any In-
dian in respect of any such property or the succession thereto if
the property passes to an Indian, nor shall any such property
be taken into account in determining the duty payable under
the Dominion Succession Duty Act on or in respect of other
property passing to an Indian.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to or in respect of the
personal property of an Indian who has executed a waiver
under the provisions of paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of sec-
tion 14 of the Canada Elections Act, 1951.
90. (1) For the purposes of sections 87 and 89, personal
property that was
(a) purchased by Her Majesty with Indian moneys or
moneys appropriated by Parliament for the use and
benefit of Indians or bands, or
(b) given to Indians or to a band under a treaty or agreement
6. See S. 75, 76, 101, S.C. 1880 c. 28; s. 77 S.C. 1886 c. 43; s. 99-101 S.C. 1906 c.
81; s. 102-104 S.C. 1927 c. 98.
7. S. II S.C. 1884 c. 27.
8. S. 3 S.C. 1888 c. 22.
9. S.C. 1951 c. 29; 9a R.S.C. c. 1-6 s. 87.
19791
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between a band and Her Majesty, shall be deemed always
to be situated on a reserve.
Subsection 87(2) was repealed in 1960.10
Indian Tradition and the Treaties
Jenness, in his tome entitled The Indians of Canada," com-
ments that the "socialistic character of Indian life" was the prin-
cipal check on material ambitions. Such an approach to the
distribution of food and material goods also explains the absence
of modern forms of taxation in traditional Indian life. Moreover,
in the majority of tribes in Canada land was not a proper subject
for private ownership. If a major object of modern taxation con-
sists in equalizing the distribution of wealth, the communal
aspects of ownership of property in traditional Indian life ac-
complished such a goal. The forced distribution of the goods of
the wealthy among the Inuit 12 of northern Canada or the
"potlatch" 13 of the West Coast tribes appear in such context as
forms of taxation. The financing of public institutions, which ac-
counts for so much of modern taxation, was generally achieved
by voluntary participation and contribution. 4 Excise duties and
real property taxes were the principal forms of taxation at the
time of contact between the Indian tribes and European settlers.
Contact between the two groups was structured in accordance
with treaties signed between the Indian tribes and the responsible
government. In Eastern Canada:
[T]hese treaties were little more than territorial cessions in
return for once-for-all grants, usually in goods, although there
is contemporary evidence that some of the Indians involved
considered that the government was assuming broader
trusteeship responsibilities as part of the bargain. Annuities, or
annual payments for the land rights ceded, appeared in a treaty
in 1818, after which they became usual. At this stage, the pro-
vision of land for Indian reserves only occasionally formed
part of the surrender terms. Similarly, the right to continue
hunting and fishing over ceded territories was very rarely men-
10. S. I S.C. 1960 c. 8.
I1. D. JENNEss, THE INDIANS OF CANADA (6th ed. 1963).
12. HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 81 (Atheneum ed. 1968).
13. G. MANUEL, THE FOURTH WORLD, AN INDIAN REALITY 77 (1974).
14. E. BENNETr, CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE CREE (Unpublished paper, 1978, College
of Law, University of Saskatchewan).
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tioned in the written terms of surrender. Not until 1850, when
cessions of land rights were taken by William Robinson along
the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, were
treaties made that granted to the Indians all four items: once-
for-all expenditures, annuities, reserves and guarantees
concerning hunting and fishing. It was for this reason that
Alexander Morris, most widely known of the government's
negotiators, wrote of them as constituting the "forerunners of
the future treaties" to be made by the recently created Domin-
ion. II
The "numbered" treaties (numbered 1 to 11) were signed be-
tween 1871 and 1921 and entailed the surrender of the entire
prairie region of Canada and the western half of what is now the
Northwest Territories. With respect to mainland British Colum-
bia and other areas in northern Canada, treaties were not signed
and are only now being negotiated. No references to taxation are
found in the written terms of the treaties. Oral assurances and
promises are recorded that intimated that the Indians were to be
prepared to adopt changes in their way of life and yet suggested
that no compulsion to do so would be exerted. Thus in 1876 the
Treaty Commissioner for Treaty No. 6 observed:
I accordingly shaped my address, so as to give them con-
fidence in the intentions of the'government, and to quiet their
apprehensions. I impressed strongly on them the necessity of
changing their present mode of life, and commencing to make
homes and gardens for themselves, so as to be prepared for the
diminution of the buffalo and other large animals which is go-
ing on so rapidly.
I then fully explained to them the proposals I had to
make-that we did not wish to interfere with their present
mode of living and that we would assign them reserves and
assist them as was being done elsewhere, in commencing to
farm, . ..
What was offered was a gift as they still had their old mode
of living. 16
The only specific reference to taxation in the oral assurances
recorded at the time of the treaties is contained in the report of
the Treaty Commissioner in respect of Treaty No. 8 in 1899:
15. INDIANS CLAIMS COMMISSION, INDIAN CLAIMS IN CANADA 9 (1975).
16. MORRIS, TREATIES OF CANADA WITH THE INDIANS, 1880, 183-86 COLES CANA-
DIANA (1971).
1979]
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There was expressed at every point the fear that the making
of the Treaty would be followed by the curtailment of the
hunting and fishing privileges, and many were impressed with
the notion that the Treaty would lead to taxation and enforced
rrdlitary service.
We assured them that the Treaty would not lead to any forced
interference with their mode of life, that it did not open the
way to the imposition of any tax, and that there was no fear of
enforced military service.1 7
Indian Powers of Taxation After Treaty
The Federation of Saskatchewan Indians observed in 1977:
INHERENT POWERS OF INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
Indian governments traditionally exercised the powers of
sovereign nations and the most fundamental right of a
sovereign nation is the right to govern its people and territory
under its own laws and customs.
Inherent means that the right of self-government was not
granted by Parliament or any other branch of any foreign
government. Indians have always had that right and the
Treaties re-enforce this position.
Indian tribes and subsequently Indian Bands are qualified to
exercise powers of self-government because they are indepen-
dent political groups. Among the inherent powers of Indian
government are the power to:
a) determine the form of government;
b) define conditions for membership in the nation;
c) regulate the domestic relations of its members;
d) levy and collect taxes.' 8
Federal legislation has acknowledged only the most limited
power to levy taxes in Indian governments and has never con-
templated inherent powers approaching that described above. In
1884 the Indian Advancement Act, which sought to replace
government by chiefs in council with government by council, pro-
vided that bands considered "fit" might assess and tax "lands of
Indians enfranchised, or in possession of lands by location ticket
in the reserve subject to the approval and confirmation of the
17. Treaty No. 8 (1899), Queens Printer, Ottawa.
18. Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, "Indian Government," 1977, Prince
Albert, Saskatchewan.
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Superintendent General." 1 9 The assessment was subject to "cor-
rection" by the Indian agent and the annual tax was restricted to
one half of one percent of the assessed value of the land. The
revenue might only be expended on matter with respect to which
the council might pass bylaws. The provision remained un-
changed20 until 1951. No Indian band in western Canada was
considered "fit" to exercise the power first conferred in 1884. In
1951 the modem form of the provision was adopted. It is now
Section 83 of the Indian Act:
83. (1) Without prejudice to the powers conferred by sec-
tion 81, where the Governor in Council declares that a band
has reached an advanced stage of development, the council of
the band may, subject to the approval of the Minister, make
by-laws for any or all of the following purposes, namely
(a) the raising of money by
(i) the assessment and taxation of interests in land in the
reserve of persons lawfully in possession thereof, and
(ii) the licensing of businesses, callings, trades and oc-
cupations;
(b) the appropriation and expenditure of moneys of the band
to defray band expenses;
(c) the appointment of officials to conduct the business of
the council, prescribing their duties and providing for
their remuneration out of any moneys raised pursuant to
paragraph (a);
(d) the payment of remuneration, in such amount as may be
approved by the Minister, to chiefs and touncillors, out
of any moneys raised pursuant to paragraph (a);
(e) the imposition of a penalty for non-payment of taxes im-
posed pursuant to this section, recoverable on summary
conviction, not exceeding the amount of the tax or the
amount remaining unpaid;
(f) the raising of money from band members to support
band projects; and
(g) with respect to any matter arising out of or ancillary to
the exercise of powers under this section.
(2) No expenditure shall be made out of moneys raised pur-
suant to paragraph (1)(a) except under the authority of a by-
law of the council of the band.21
19. S.C. 1884 c. 28 s. 10(11).
20. S.C. 1886 c. 44 s. 10(k); S.C. 1906 c. 81 s. 194j).
21. R.S.C. 1970 c. 1-6 s. 83.
19791
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Subparagraph 83(1)(f) was added in 1956.22
The Franchise and Taxation
The principal forms of revenue of the founding colonies of
Confederation in 1867 were customs and excise. 21 It was accord-
ingy determined that as the federal government was to assume
the more burdensome expenditures it should be accorded
unlimited powers of taxation, including the tariff. Provincial
powers were restricted to direct taxation and thereby provided for
municipal real property taxation. It has been observed:
Taxation in direct form was so detested in almost all provinces
but Ontario [where municipal property and income taxes were
well developed at Confederation] that it can be assumed that
there was no serious expectation that the provinces would use
these powers. Indeed it is evident from speeches of the day that
the founding fathers counted on the very unpopularity of
direct taxation to prevent its extensive use. Nonetheless, the
power had to be given the provinces so that it could in turn be
conferred upon the municipalities to enable them to continue
to collect property taxes. 4
Necessity, however, required that the provinces utilize their
powers of taxation and accordingly British Columbia, in 1876,
and Prince Edward Island, in 1894, levied personal income taxes.
The expenses of World War I caused the imposition of a federal
income tax in 1917, and shortly thereafter a federal sales tax was
introduced. Heavy capital expenditures after the war compelled
the provinces to devise new methods of taxation; gasoline taxes
and liquor control "were to build many a road and school." Pro-
vincial sales taxes were not introduced until the Depression. By
1940 there were provincial retail taxes in Saskatchewan and
Quebec and municipal sales taxes in Montreal and Quebec City.
Today the only province in which no sales tax is levied is Alberta.
The early reliance of provincial governments upon real prop-
erty taxation effectively disenfranchised Indians resident upon
reserves. The Indian interest in reserve lands was not entered
upon the assessment list upon which the right to vote depended. 2
22. S.C. 1956, c. 40 s. 21.
23. See 1 PERRY, TAXES, TARIFFS AND SUBSIDIES (1955).
24. Moore & Perry, Financing of Canadian Federation, Canadian Tax Paper No. 43
(1966) Canada Tax Foundation, at 1.
25. See Bartlett, CITIZENS MINUS: INDIANS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE, SASK. L. REV.
(1980).
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Thus Section 4 of the Election Act of the Province of Ontario
passed in 1876 provided:
4. To remove doubts, it is hereby declared that all Indians,
or persons with part Indian blood, who have been duly enfran-
chised, and all Indians or persons with part Indian blood, who
do not reside among Indians, though they participate in the an-
nuities, interest moneys and rents of a tribe, band or body of
Indians, shall be entitled to vote, subject to the same qualifica-
tions in other respects, and to the same provisions and restric-
tions, as other persons in the electoral district.26
The section recognized the right to vote of enfranchised Indians
who had been allotted sufficiently valuable land or those Indians,
albeit not enfranchised, who had left the reserve and managed to
acquire sufficient real property so as to be eligible to vote.
Until 1885 federal elections were governed by existing provin-
cial statutes.27 In 1885 the Conservative government of Sir John
A. Macdonald passed the Electoral Franchise At 28 to provide for
federal elections. The franchise was extended to Indians in the
east possessed of real property on a reserve valued in excess of
$150 and not otherwise qualified.29 The Six Nations Indians ex-
pressed concern as to the implications of the extension of the
franchise. Chief Jones wrote to Macdonald:
Many of the Indians on the Grand River Reservation have
been told, that in case they received the right to vote, then
Treaty Rights with the Government would not be able to com-
pel the Government to observe and carry out the treaties.
They have also been told that the granting of the Franchise
to them, was a scheme of the Government with the object of
imposing direct taxation upon them.
These two subjects are being used successfully in many cases
to induce the Indians to either vote against your government or
not to vote at all-Kindly give us your opinion upon these two
subjects immediately and oblige. 0
Macdonald wrote to Chief Johnson of Desoranto as follows:
26. S.C. 1875-76 c. 10.
27. S. 41 British North America Act 1867.
28. S.C. 1885 c. 40.
29. S. 11 (c) S.C. 1885 c. 40.
30. PAC MG 26A, vol. 428 209783, Aug. 8, 1886.
1979]
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I am informed that you are under the impression that if an In-
dian on a reserve should exercise the franchise under the late
act it would render him liable to pay additional taxes. This is
altogether a mistake. The Grits who did all they could to
deprive the Indians of the right of voting are spreading that
falsehood in order to prevent the original proprietors of the
soil of this country from standing on a footing of equality with
the white men who have come into it. I can assure you that an
Indian will not increase his liability, his burdens, or his duties
as a subject or citizen by voting at the election. He will stand
exactly in the same position in all respects the hour after he
may vote as he stood the hours before he voted.3
The Grits (Liberals) were returned to power in 1896 and the Fran-
chise: Act3" of 1898 eliminated the separate federal franchise. In
1920 the federal franchise was reestablished but excluded "In-
dians ordinarily resident on an Indian reservation, provided,
however, that any Indian who has served in the naval, military or
air forces of Canada in the war declared by Her Majesty on
August 4th, 1914, against the Empire of Germany and subse-
quently against other powers shall be qualified to vote." 33 In
1944 the franchise was extended to the Indians who fought in
World War II, and in 1948 the spouses of those who had served
in the two World Wars. 4 The anxiety of the Six Nations, ex-
pressed sixty-five years before, proved well founded when in 1950
the franchise was extended to those Indians who "[e]xecuted a
waiver, in a form prescribed by the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, of exemptions under the Indian Act from taxation
on and in respect of personal property, and subsequent to the ex-
ecution of such waiver a writ has issued ordering an election in
any electoral district.""
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, who moved sec-
ond reading of the amendment in the House of Commons,
observed:
The exemption from taxation of real and personal property
held by Indians on reserves has been modified so that it will
31. Macdonald Paper, MG 26A vol. 436 215104-6, July 7, 1887.
32. S.C. 1898 c. 14.
33. S.C. 1920 c. 46 s. 29(1) Dominion Elections Act; R.S.C. 1927 c. 53 s. 29(1); S.C.
1938 c. 46 s. 14.
34. S.C. 1948 c. 46.
35. S.C. 1950 c. 35 s. 1.
[Vol. 7
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not apply to the personal property of Indians ordinarily resi-
dent on reserves, other than veterans of the first and second
great wars and their wives, who execute a waiver under an
amendment to the Dominion Elections Act, 1938; otherwise
the exemption from taxation stands as it has stood since this
provision was enacted in 1876 ....
It is proposed to apply this only to personal property; the
real property on the reserve is held in trust by the crown and
does not belong to the individual Indian, but is held for the use
and benefit of the band or community as a whole, and it is felt
that such property should not be taxed, as the individual In-
dian has only an occupational interest in the land.
It may be of interest to note that the Indian Act of 1869 was
entitled "An Act for The Gradual Enfranchisement of
Indians." At this time it was apparently thought that Indians
would become readily absorbed into the general community,
and provision was made for any qualified Indian to attain full
citizenship by applying for enfranchisement. Since then the
way has been open for Indians who have sufficiently
demonstrated their ability to maintain themselves off reserves
to attain all the rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens
of the country. The procedure is by order in council. Since
yearly records were established in 1918, more than 5,000 In-
dians have sought and received enfranchisement.36
A member of the House of Commons responded:
And yet at least in my opinion, we ask the Indian to barter
his right to the exemption for the privilege of voting in a
federal election. That is something which I feel is funda-
mentally and basically wrong.
We inquire why this is done, and the minister says he does
not want to set up a special category of Indians. It seems to me
there are about one hundred Indians in reserves in
Canada-and I give that figure only as a rough guess-who are
earning taxable incomes, or incomes that would be exempt
under our present legislation. I would be very pleased to have
the minister correct me if I am wrong. In other words we are
disfranchising about 125,000 people, or at least making it dif-
ficult for them, and asking them to waive some of their rights,
in order that the Department of National Revenue here in Ot-
36. June 21, 1950 H.C. Debates, vol. 4.
1979]
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tawa may collect some revenue from about one hundred In-
dians."
The franchise granted to the Eskimos in that year was not subject
to any conditions. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
explained that "the Eskimo, not being exempt from taxation,
may vote." 38 In 1951 the franchise was extended to those Indians
and their spouses who served in the Korean War." It was not un-
til 1960 that the federal franchise was finally extended to Indians
under the same conditions as other citizens of Canada. The
restriction on the franchise requiring a waiver of the taxation ex-
emption was repealed.4" The Minister of Citizenship and Im-
migration expressed a dramatically different view from that of
nine years previously and reiterated the remarks of Sir John A.
Macdonald nearly a century before:
The proposal now before the house is that the restriction
which applies to the Indians living on reserves be abolished so
that all Indians will have the right to vote on the same basis as
other citizens. Many reasons can be forwarded in support of
this proposal. Foremost is the fact that it is not in keeping with
our democratic principles that there should be citizens-and all
Indians are citizens-who are restricted in the exercise of one
of the fundamental rights of a democracy, the right to par-
ticipate in the election of the representatives in parliament.
Second, however well-intentioned, the present legislation has
fallen far short of the objective recommended by the special
joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons.
Third, the present legislation has been quite unacceptable to
the majority of the Indians resident on reserves, as is evidenced
by the fact which I mentioned previously this afternoon, that
since 1950 only 122 Indians out of an estimated 60,000 adult
Indians residing on reserves have waived their exemption to
taxation.
Fourth, in recent years more and more Indians and Indian
groups have been pressing for the franchise free from the ex-
isting restriction.
Finally, there is the reason mentioned by the Prime Minister
[1Mr. Diefenbaker] in his speech to this house on January 18,
37. May 15, 1951 H.C. Debates, vol. 4, per Gibson M.P.
38. June 1950, H.C. Debates, p. 3812, per Harris M.P.
39. S.C. 1951 c. 3 s. 6.
40. S.C. 1960 c. 7 s. 1.
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namely that it will remove in the eyes of the world any sugges-
tion that in Canada colour or race places any citizen in an in-
ferior category to other citizens of the country.
My comment that many Indians and Indian organizations
have been pressing for the vote free from the existing restric-
tions was not intended to create the impression that all Indians
are in favour of having the vote. There are some who are op-
posed and their objection is apparently based on the fear that
it will mean the loss of aboriginal or treaty rights. I am not
aware of any legal basis for this fear and I would like to repeat
again the assurance given to the Indians by the Prime Minister
in this house on January 18, that existing rights and treaties,
traditionally or otherwise, possessed by the Indians, will not in
any way be abrogated or diminished in consequence of their
having the right to vote.41
From 1867 until 1885 and from 1898 'until 1920 the federal
franchise was determined by the provisions of the provincial Elec-
tion Acts. Such legislation also determined eligibility to vote in
provincial elections. The western provinces of Alberta, British
Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan disqualified "Indians"
from voting, with exceptions in the case of the latter three pro-
vinces for those who served in the armed forces. The franchise
was granted in Alberta in 1965, in British Columbia in 1949, in
Manitoba in 1952, and in Saskatchewan in 1960.42 The eastern
provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
and Quebec disqualified "Indians resident on a reserve" from
voting, with the exception in the case of the first three provinces
41. Mar. 9, 1960 c. 7, s. 1.
42.
Alberta Election Act, S.A. 1909 c. 3 s.
10(4).
R.S.A. 1922 c. 4 s. 10(d)
R.S.A. 1942 c. 5 s. 16(d)
R.S.A. 1955 c. 97 s. 16(1)(d
repealed S.A. 1965 c. 23
British Columbia S.D.C. 1875 c. 2 s. 1
R.S.B.C. 1897 c. 67 s. 8
R.S.B.C. 1911 c. 72 s. 8
R.S.B.C. 1924 c. 76 s. 5(a)
S.B.C. 1931 c. 21
R.S.B.C. 1936 c. 84
amended S.B.C. 1947 c. 28-
for war service
repealed S.B.C. 1949 c. 9
Manitoba S.M. 1886 c. 29 s. 12
R.S.M. 1891 c. 49 s. 14(b)
R.S.M. 1902 c. 52 s. 19(b)
amended S.M. 1931 c. 10 s. 16(b)
R.S.M. 1940 c. 57 s. 15(b)
repealed S.M. 1952 c. 18
Saskatchewan
Elections Act S.S. 1908 c. 2 s. 11
R.S.S. 1909 c. 3 s. 11
R.S.S. 1920 c. 3 s. 12(3)
R.S.S. 1930 c. 4 s. 12(3)
R.S.S. 1940 c. 4 s. 12(3)
amended S.S. 1951 c. 3 s. 29(b)-
for war service
repealed S.S. 1960 c. 45 s. 1.
1979]
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of those who had served in the armed forces. The franchise was
granted in Ontario in 1954, in New Brunswick and Prince Ed-
ward Island in 1963, and in Quebec in 1969.41
Jurisdiction Over Indians and Taxation
Section 91(3) of the British North America Act4 4 confers ex-
clusive legislative authority upon the Canadian Parliament in
respect of "the raising of money by any mode or system of taxa-
tion." Section 92(2) confers exclusive legislative authority upon
the legislature of each province in relation to "direct taxation
within the Province in order to the raising of revenue for provin-
cial purposes." The meaning of "direct taxation" was declared in
Atlantic Smoke Shops v. Conlon" where the Lord Chancellor on
behalf of the Privy Council adopted "[t]he definition of a direct
tax which was used by Lord Hobhouse in Bank of Toronto v.
Lambe and which is derived from John Stuart Mill's 'Principles
of Political Economy' (bk. V. c.3) as (one which is demanded
from the very persons who it is intended or desired should pay
it). ' 4 6 In Atlantic Smoke Shops a sales tax upon tobacco was
held to be within provincial jurisdiction because it was imposed
"immediately on the consumer." "It is a tax which is to be paid
by the last purchaser of the article, and, since there is no question
43.
Ontario S.O. 1875-76 c. 10
R.S.O. 1877 c. 10 s. 7
R.S.O. 1887 c. 9 s. 7
R.S.O. 1897 c. 9 s. 12-14
R.S.O. 1914 c. 8 s. 22
amended S.O. 1926 c. 4 s. 22-
for service in
World War II
R.S.O. 1937 c. 8 s. 22
amended S.O. 1939 c. 11 s. 22-
for service in
World War 11
R.S.O. 1950 c. 11 s. 22
repealed S.O. 1954 c. 25
New Brunswick
Elections Act S.N.B. 1889 c. 3 s. 24-
disqualified "Indians"
R.S.N.B. 1908 c. 3 s. 26
R.S.N.B. 1927 c. 4 s. 6
44. R.S.C. 1970 App. 5.
amended S.N.B. 1944 c. 8 s. 34
R.S.N.B. 1952 c. 70 s. 34
repealed
Prince Edward
Island
repealed
Quebec Elections
S.N.B. 1963 c. 7 s. 34
S.P.E.I. 1913
S.P.E.I. 1922 c. 5 s. 32
S.P.E.I. 1931 c. 5 s. 3
R.S.P.E.I. 1951 c. 48 s. 9
S.P.E.I. 1963 c. 11 s. 22
Act R.S.Q. 1888 Art. 172
R.S.Q. 1909 Art. 180
S.Q. 1915 c. 17 s. 5
R.S.Q. 1941 c. 5 s. 13(2)
R.S.Q. 1964 c. 7 s. 48(c)
repealed S.Q. 1969 c. 13
45. [1943] A.C. 550, 562-63, per Viscount Simon, L.C.
46. Id., citing Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575, 582.
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of further re-sale, the tax cannot be passed on to any other per-
son by subsequent dealing. '4 7 Direct taxation has been held to
embrace income tax, land tax, and sales tax upon gasoline, li-
quor, and other goods. A sales tax imposed upon building
materials, subsequently incorporated into houses, was held to
constitute a direct tax as "there was no passing on the tax on the
materials in their original form." The builder was the "ultimate
user of the materials." ' Estate taxes are considered to be ex-
clusively within federal jurisdiction because the tax falls primarily
on the executor who passes the burden along to the persons who
ultimately pay. Succession duty is regarded as a direct tax falling
on the successor and is accordingly within provincial
jurisdiction.49
Exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians and Lands reserved for In-
dians" resides in the Canadian Parliament.5 Chief Justice Laskin
declared in Cardinal v. Attorney General of Alberta51:
Where land in a Province is, as in the present case, an admitted
Indian reserve, its administration and the law applicable
thereto, so far at least as Indians thereon are concerned, de-
pend on federal legislation. Indian reserves are enclaves which,
so long as they exist as reserves, are withdrawn from provincial
regulatory power. If provincial legislation is applicable at all, it
is only by referential incorporation through adoption by the
Parliament of Canada. This is seen in the Indian Act, with
which I will deal later in these reasons.2
Justice Martland, writing for the majority, rejected the enclave
approach:
A provincial Legislature could not enact legislaiion in rela-
tion to Indians, or in relation to Indian reserves, but this is far
from saying that the effect of s. 91(24) of the British North
America Act, 1867, was to create enclaves within a Province
within the boundaries of which provincial legislation could
have no application."
47. [1943] A.C. 550, 563, per Viscount Simon, L.C.
48. Cairns Constr. v. Government of Saskatchewan [1959] 27 W.W.R. 297 (Sask.
C.A.).
49. Provincial Treasurer of Alberta v. Kerr [1933] A.C. 710 (P.C.).
50. Section 91 (24) British North America Act R.S.C. 1970 App. 5.
51. [1973] 40 D.L.R.3d 553 (Can. S. Ct.)
52. Id. at 568. The Chief Justice affirmed such an approach in Natural Parents v.
Superintendent of Child Welfare [1976] 1 W.W.R. 699 (Can. S. Ct.).
53. [1973] 40 D.L.R.3d 553 at 559-60 (S. Ct. Can.).
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Prior to 1951 the application of provincial legislation was, of
course, subject to occupation of the field by federal legislation
such as the Indian Act, and at least one authority declared that
the taxation provisions of that statute precluded the imposition of
provincial taxation upon Indians.
Under ss. 102, 103 and 104 of the Indian Act, the Dominion
Parliament has legislated in respect to the subject of taxation
as it may affect "Indians and Lands Reserved for the
Indians," a subject assigned exclusively to that legislative
body, and having done so, I do not see under what principle
provincial legislation can be made to supplement, change or
restrict such federal enactment.
True the federal enactment makes no reference to poll or in-
come tax, but its failure to do so does not in my opinion, give
a provincial Legislature power to add that which the federal
enactment may have omitted.
It is my view that ss. 102, 103 and 104 of the Indian Act are
exhaustive on the subject of Indian taxation so as to exclude
provincial legislation, and therefore the provisions of the City
Charter providing for the payment of a poll tax, has no ap-
plication to an unenfranchised Indian whether residing on or
off the Reserve.1
In 1951 the present Section 88 of the Indian Act was in-
troduced," apparently with the aim of restating or codifying the
application of traditional constitutional law principles to Indians.
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the
Parliament of Canada, all laws of general application from
time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in
respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that
such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule,
regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except to the extent
that such laws make provision for any matter for which provi-
sion is made by or under this Act.
Section 88 specifically provides for a narrow notion of occupa-
tion of field and thus renders academic much of the debate as to
the applicability of the enclave approach or a broad notion of oc-
cupation of the field on a reserve. "Subject to the terms of the
treaty, provincial laws, of general application" will apply except
54. Re Kane [1940] 1 D.L.R. 390, 395-96 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
55. R.S.C. 1970 c. 1-6.
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to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Indian Act and its
regulations. Section 88 does not, however, provide for non-
Indians and it is therefore necessary to examine the preexisting
case law in that regard. The section represents a significant intru-
sion of provincial jurisdiction into the powers of self-government
to which bands and band councils aspire. The section provides
for the imposition of provincial taxation upon Indians subject
only to "the terms of any treaty" and the provisions of the In-
dian Act. The provisions of the Indian Act will be examined after
considering the limits imposed upon provincial taxation by treaty.
The Treaties: Subject to the Terms of Any Treaty
The application of provincial laws of general application to In-
dians is expressed by Section 88 of the Indian Act to be "subject
to the terms of any treaty." Federal legislation is not so
restricted.16 The precise ambit of arrangements which might deny
the operation of provincial taxing statutes is not settled. It has
been held, however, to extend to arrangements between the Hud-
son's Bay Company and the Indians of Vancouver Island,17 and
to exclude international treaties between states. In Francis v.
Queen," an Indian resident on a reserve invoked the terms of the
56. R. v. George [1966] 55 D.L.R.2d 386, 397 (S. Ct. Can.).
57. [1964] 52 W.W.R. (N.S.) 193 (B.C.C.A.) aff'd 52 D.L.R.2d 481 (S. Ct. Can.).
Davey, J.A., declared: "In considering whether Ex. 8 is a treaty within the meaning of
sec. [88] regard ought to be paid to the history of our country; its original occupation and
settlement; the fact that the Hudson's Bay Company was the proprietor and, to use a
feudal term contained in its charters, the lord of the lands in the Northwest Territories
and Vancouver Island; and the part that company played in the settlement and develop-
ment of this country. In the Charter granting Vancouver Island to the Hudson's Bay
Company, it was charged with the settlement and colonization of that island. That was
clearly part of the Imperial policy to head off American settlement of and claims to the
territory. In that sense the Hudson's Bay Company was an instrument of Imperial policy.
It was also the long-standing policy of the Imperial government and of the Hudson's Bay
Company that the crown or the company should buy from the Indians their land for set-
tlement by white colonists. In pursuance of that policy many agreements, some very for-
mal, others informal, were made with various bands and tribes of Indians for the pur-
chase of their lands. These agreements frequently conferred upon the grantors hunting
rights over the unoccupied lands so sold. Considering the relationship between the crown
and the Hudson's Bay Company in the colonization of this country, and the Imperial and
corporate policies reflected in those agreements, I cannot regard Ex. 8 as a mere agree-
ment for the sale of land made between a private vendor and a private purchaser. In view
of the notoriety of these facts, I entertain no doubt that parliament intended the word
'treaty' in sec. [88] to include all such agreements, and to except their provisions from the
operative part of the section."
58. [1956] S.C.R. 618.
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Jay Treaty of November 19, 1794, between His Britannic Majesty
and the United States of America to resist the imposition of
federal customs and sales tax. The claim was denied, inter alia,
because, as declared by Justice Kellock: "I think it is quite clear
that 'treaty' in this section does not extend to an international
treaty such as the Jay Treaty but only to treaties with Indians
which are mentioned throughout the statute. [Indian Act]." 9 As
Justice Davey declared in R. v. White and Bob60 :
[I]t can be safely said that it does not mean an "executive
act establishing relationships between what are recognized as
two or more independent states and in sovereign capacities;..."
per Rand, J. in Francis v. Reg.
It is also clear, in my opinion, that the word is not used in its
widest sense as including agreements between individuals deal-
ing with their private and personal affairs. Its meaning lies be-
tween those extremes.61
It is to be observed that, in contrast to the position in the
United States, subjects of a contracting party to an international
treaty cannot rely upon its terms in the absence of implementing
legislation. Thus Francis's claim to rely upon the Jay Treaty was
entirely unsuccessful. As Chief Justice Kevin observed: "The Jay
Treaty was not a Treaty of Peace and it is clear that in Canada
such rights and privileges as are here advanced of subjects of a
contracting party to a treaty are enforceable by the Courts only
where the treaty has been implemented or sanctioned by legisla-
tion. ,61
With respect to treaties that are contemplated by the language
of Section 88, two possible arguments might be made to deny the
imposition of provincial taxation: First, that the tax sought to be
imposed is directed to the raising of revenue for items that were
promised the treating Indians; second, that the tax sought to be
imposed is in violation of the promises made that no such tax
would be levied. The first argument was presented in Regina v.
Johnston. 3 Prior to 1973, Saskatchewan imposed a hospitaliza-
tion tax upon its residents, as the remaining provinces of Canada
still do. The revenue so raised was applied toward the financing
59. Id. at 631.
60. [1964] 52 W.W.R. (N.S.) 193 (B.C.C.A.).
61. Id. at 197.
62. [19561 S.C.R. 618.
63. [1966] 56 W.W.R. 565 (Sask. C.A.).
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of hospitals in the province. Walter Johnston, a member of the
tribe of Indians with which Treaty No. 6 was signed, argued that
the following clauses of the treaty exempted him from liability to
pay:
That a medicine chest shall be kept at the house of each In-
dian Agent for the use and benefit of the Indians at the direc-
tion of such agent.
That in the event hereafter of the Indians comprised within
this treaty being overtaken by any pestilence, or by a general
famine, the Queen, on being satisfied and certified thereof by
Her Indian Agent or Agents, will grant to the Indians
assistance of such character and to such extent as Her Chief
Superintendent of Indian Affairs shall deem necessary and suf-
ficient to relieve the Indians from the calamity that shall have
befallen them.
Chief Justice Culliton readily concluded that the treaty was of a
type contemplated by Section 88:
It was agreed and so found by the trial judge that the
respondent was an Indian as defined in the Indian Act and that
he was a descendant of the Indians on behalf of whom treaty 6
was made. Treaty 6 is, in my opinion, a treaty of the type
referred to in sec. [88] of the Indian Act. He is, therefore, in
my opinion, entitled to any rights or immunities under the said
treaty that may have been contemplated by parliament in
enacting sec. [88] of the Indian Act.64
The Chief Justice adopted the "ordinary meaning" approach to
the interpretation of the terms of the treaty and relied upon the
record compiled by Treaty Commissioner Morris 65 and con-
cluded:
The [pestilence] clause, it means no more than it plainly
states: The obligation of the Crown in the event of pestilence
or general famine, to provide such assistance as the chief
superintendent of Indians should deem necessary and sufficient
to meet the calamity. With every deference to the contrary
opinion of the learned judge of the magistrate's court, I do not
think this clause of the treaty has any relevancy in the deter-
mination of the question with which he was faced.
64. Id.
65. MoRRIs, supra note 16.
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Again, on the plain reading of the "medicine chest" clause,
it means no more than the words clearly convey: An undertak-
ing by the crown to keep at the house of the Indian agent a
medicine chest for the use and benefit of the Indians at the
direction of the agent.66
Walter Johnston was required to pay the hospitalization tax.
Four years later in Regina v. Swimmer,67 the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal reaffirmed the position adopted in Johnston and
rejected the argument that a member of the tribe of Indians
which was a party to Treaty No. 6 was not subject to the payment
of the Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance premium. Chief
Justice Culliton declared: "[T]he terms of Treaty #6 do not im-
pose upon the Government of Canada the obligation of pro-
viding, without cost, medical and hospital services to all
Indians."6
It has yet to be argued in court that the oral assurances offered
by the Treaty No. 8 Commissioner that "it did not lead the way
to the imposition of any tax" 69 operate to deny the application of
provincial tax. Such argument appears unlikely to succeed. The
courts have been reluctant to look beyond the written terms of
the treaties to ascertain the promises made by the Crown to the
Indians, and the only specific reference to taxation that was
recorded was in the oral discussion preceding Treaty No. 8.
Arguments based upon the retention by treaty of the sovereignty
of Indian bands in respect to taxation appear very difficult to
reconcile with the "plain reading" analysis employed by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Johnston and Swimmer.
Who is Exempt? The Provisions of the Indian Act
Section 87 of the Indian Act exempts from taxation prescribed
property of an "Indian or band." Entitlement to be registered as
an "Indian" under the Indian Act is confined to members of
bands historically reputed to consist of Indians, descendants in
the male line, and wives of those persons. Two groups are
65. [1966] 56 W.W.R. 565 (Sask. C.A.) (emphasis added). Cf. Dreaver v. Regina
(Unreported Ex. Ct.) where Angers, J., gave, in the words of Culliton, C.J., an "ex-
tended interpretation" to the "medicine chest" clause relying upon oral assurances at the
time of the treaty such that the clause was held to contemplate "free medicines, drugs and
medical supplies."
67. [1971] 1 W.W.R. 756 (Sask. C.A.).
68. Id. at 760.
69. Treaty No. 8 (1899), Queens Printer, Ottawa.
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specifically disentitled-the half bloods, or m6tis, and those who
are enfranchised. The latter group includes Indian-born wives
who marry non-Indians. "Band" is defined in Section 2(1) of the
Act to refer to a body of Indians for whose use and benefit lands
have been set apart as reserves or monies held on their behalf, or
have been declared to be such by order in council.7"
It appears uncontestable that the ambit of the terms "Indian"
and "band" in Section 87 are governed by the meanings thereof
provided elsewhere in the Act. Thus it does not appear open to
argument that the mtis or nonstatus Indians may benefit from
the exemption by reference to some broader definition. The only
contentious issue that has arisen is in regard to "Indian corpora-
tions." In Kinnookimaw Beach Assoc. v. The Queen in Right of
Saskatchewan,7 the application of taxation to a nonprofit cor-
poration formed by seven Indian bands as equal shareholders for
the development of reserve lands as a golf, tennis, and beach
resort was considered. The Saskatchewan Board of Revenue
Commissioner "with regret" held that the corporation was liable
to pay a provincial sales tax (termed "education and hospitaliza-
tion tax") upon capital purchases. The Board acknowledged that
if the seven bands had joined together in an organization other
than a corporate body, they would have enjoyed the benefit of
the exemption under Section 87. This observation is to be con-
sidered in the light of the Department of Indian Affairs' policy of
insisting that Indian band economic development take place
through corporations. Upon appeal to the Saskatchewan Queen's
Bench Court, it was argued "that this was an appropriate case
for the corporate veil to be lifted." '7 Upon an examination of the
inconclusive jurisprudence in this area, Chief Justice Johnson
declared:
It seems that if the corporate veil can be lifted to prevent
taxpayers from avoiding the payment of taxes, it may also be
lifted to give taxpayers the benefit of tax exemptions in a case
such as this where such exemption is specially granted to a par-
ticular group or class of people for whose care and assistance
the legislation is designed as is the Indian Act. This would lead
to "the just and equitable enforcement of a tax law" in the
words of Culliton C.J.S. This Act is designed to ensure that
70. See also Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 27 BuFFALO L. REv. 581 (1978).
71. Unreported as yet, Sask. C.A., June 28, 1979.
72. [1978] 6 W.W.R. 749, 751 (Sask. Q.B.).
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the Indian people are specially cared and provided for by the
government of Canada. It is notorious that dozens of projects
by the federal government [are] to enable the Indian people to
help themselves as a step in their upward development and
growth, and I can take judicial notice that the project of the ap-
pellant falls within the class of these works. It would be com-
pletely incongruous and anomalous for public funds to be ex-
pended by one government to assist Indian peoples if another
government were permitted to assess taxes payable by Indians
ultimately which would not be assessable if the corporate struc-
ture were not the vehicle for carrying out their project.
Accordingly, I am of the view that in this case the lifting of
the corporate veil is justified and, having done that, I find that
the appellant association is owned and controlled by Indian
bands and carries out the works of the association on an In-
dian reserve. These Indian bands are, accordingly, entitled to
the benefit of the tax exemption."
This reasoning was rejected by the Chief Justice of the Court of
Appeal:
[The autonomous and independent existence of the corporate
structure must be accepted and respected unless it can be
shown that such structure is being deliberately used to defeat
the intent and purpose of a particular law, or is intended to or
does convey a false picture of independence between one or
more corporate entities which, if recognized, would result in
the defeat of a just and equitable right. 74
The Chief Justice stated that there was no doubt
as to the true legal position of the Association as related to the
Indian Bands. Here the Indian Bands decided that the most ef-
ficient manner of attaining their objectives was through a cor-
porate structure.
To grant to the Association the exemption from taxation
provided for in Section 87 of the Indian Act, supra, would be
to destroy the legal obligations of the Association as an in-
dependent corporate entity and to determine its obligations by
the character of its shareholders."
73. Id. at 754.
74. Unreported as yet Sask. C.A., June 28, 1979, p. 5 of 7. Leave to Appeal to
Supreme Court of Canada denied Nov. 6, 1979.
75. Id., p. 6 of 7.
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The Court of Appeal adopted the classic "form" rather than
"substance" approach to the application of the tax exemption
and relied upon the apothesis of such reasoning in Pioneer Laun-
dry v. Minister of National Revenue.76
The jurisprudence dealing with the lifting of the corporate veil
is notorious in its unpredictability."1 It appears unfortunate that
both courts should consider it necessary to decide the case on this
basis, and yet more unfortunate that the Court of Appeal should
reject the approach of the lower court, which did at least seek to
focus upon the object and intent of Section 87 of the Indian Act.
The application of a literal formal approach devised by modern
tax law to a right declared in oral assurances in treaties with the
Indians of Canada a century ago dictates an unsympathetic and
unrealistic appraisal of the intent of the legislature.
Whatever the merits of the decision of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal, it is in accord with the announced practice of the
Department of National Revenue in the collection of income tax.
The Department has offered its opinion that:
Although "person" is defined for purposes of the Income
Tax Act to include any body corporate or public, a corpora-
tion cannot meet the definition of "Indian" in the Indian Act
and its income is not exempted from tax by these provisions,
even where its only shareholders are Indians, it head office and
physical assets are on a reserve and all of its business is carried
on there.78
What is Taxation? The Limits of the Exemption of Section 87
Section 87 affords an exemption only with respect to taxation;
it affords no protection to financial contributions which are
otherwise classified. In Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales
Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy Ltd.," applying the
British North America Act, the Privy Council described the
elements of taxation: "compulsorily imposed by a statutory
[public] committee... enforceable by law.., compulsion is an
essential feature of taxation ... the imposition of these levies is
76. [1940] A.C. 127 (P.C.). That decision was immediately rejected by amendment
to the Income Tax Act.
77. Professor Woods, now a member of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, has
observed that, "It is not ... possible to form a rationale pattern out of the court's handl-
ing of the various situations." (1957) 35 CAN. BAR. REv.
78. I.T.-62 Aug. 18, 1972, Dept. N.R.
79. [1933] 1 D.L.R. 82 (P.C.).
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for public purposes." 80 The Court declared that an "adjustment
levy" imposed upon dairy farmers selling fluid milk, which was
then apportioned among those selling manufactured dairy pro-
ducts, was a form of taxation within the meaning of the British
North America Act. In Workmen's Compensation Board v.
Canadian Pacific Railway,"' the Privy Council concluded that
levies upon employers "imposed with the object of establishing
an institution which shall provide insurance benefits for
employees," was a form of taxation. With respect to unemploy-
ment insurance funded by levies upon employers and employees,
the Privy Council found it unnecessary to decide whether the
levies constituted taxation in Attorney General for Canada v. At-
torney General for Ontario,82 but the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada appear to conclude that they did not:
I doubt whether the contribution received from the employee
can properly be described as a tax. In fact, it would seem to me
to partake more of the nature of an insurance premium or of a
payment for services and individual benefits which are to be
returned to the employee in proportion to his payments.83
The ambit of the term "taxation" in Section 87 is not precisely
defined. The interpretation adopted upon the application of the
British North America Act of 1867 seems persuasive. Such inter-
pretations suggest a broad range of levies that might be termed
"taxation" as possessing the elements of compulsion,8 4 en-
forceability, and public authorization for public purposes
described by the Privy Council. This potential range probably
caused the Federal Court of Appeal" to avoid deciding whether
80. Id. at 85, 86, per Lord Thankerton.
81. [1919] 48 D.L.R. 218 (P.C.).
82. [1937] A.C. 355, 368 (P.C.).
83. Id. at 454, per Rufret, J. (Crocket, J., concurring), 460, per Kerwin, J. (Rufret
and Cannon, J.J., concurring). Duff, C.J. (Davis, J., concurring) dissented and deter-
mined that the levies were a form of taxation at 438-39, relying on Lower Mainland v.
Crystal Dairy [1953] 1 D.L.R. 82 (P.C.).
84. In Delisle v. Shawinigan Water & Power [1941] 4 D.L.R. 556 (Que. S. Ct.),
Demers, J., declared that a sales tax imposed on electricity delivered to the home of a
member of an Indian band resident on a reserve was not a tax because it was not com-
pulsory: "I maintain that there is no tax imposed on the plaintiff. The essential
characteristics of a tax are that it is not a voluntary payment or donation but an enforced
contribution. The plaintiff is not bound to take electricity. People may illumine their
homes by other means." It is suggested that this aspect of the decision may be ignored as
being grossly inconsistent with the understanding of the Privy Council.
85. Minister of National Revenue v. Iroquois of Caughnawaga, [1977] C.T.C. 49
(Fed. C.A.). Section 66(2) of the Indian Act provides for the payment of unemployment
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unemployment insurance premiums levied under statutory
authority are "taxes" within the exemption of Section 87. The
Court rejected a finding of the umpire to that effect upon
another ground. Hospitalization taxes and provincial medicare
premiums are not levied upon Indian reserve residents because
the federal government assumes responsibility for the provision
of health services to such persons," and accordingly litigation has
not been directed to the application of the exemption under Sec-
tion 87. A viable argument might be that such levies are a form of
income taxation or property taxation and if imposed upon in-
come or property located upon the reserve, are exempt. A similar
analysis might extend to government motor vehicle insurance.8 7
The courts have distinguished between licenses and taxes in the
application of Section 87 of the Indian Act. In Attorney General
for Quebec v. Williams,8 the court appeared to adopt the distinc-
tion that a "license fee is a tax when imposed mainly for the pur-
poses of revenue." The essence of a license is the permission
granted thereby. The court convicted an Indian band member for
selling tobacco on a reserve without a license required by the
Tobacco Tax Act.
I am of the opinion that the sum of one dollar imposed by
the Government for acquiring a license for the sale of tobacco,
which remains in force until it is rescinded, can represent only
the cost of acquisition of a license, and does not constitute a
tax within the legal and constitutional meaning of the word.8 9
Similarly, a motor vehicle registration fee, a driver's license fee, 90
and a city street vendor's license fee91 have been held not to con-
stitute taxation within the meaning of Section 87. The exemption
cannot, of course, benefit a non-Indian doing business on a
reserve so as to avoid the requirement of a license fee.92
insurance premiums in certain circumstances. Such might suggest that the levies are not
"taxation" within s. 87, but cannot be considered conclusive because the exemption of
Section 87 does not, of course, preclude taxation upon property situated off a reserve.
86. See R. v. Swimmer, [1971] 1 W.W.R. 756 (Sask. C.A.).
87. Cf. R. v. Twoyoungment, [1979] 5 W.W.R. 712 (Sask. C.A.) (application of
Section 87 was not considered).
88. [1944] 82 C.C.C. 166 (Que. J.P.).
89. Id. at 169.
90. Feldman v. Jocks, [1935] 74 Que. S. Ct. 56. The decision is not beyond criticism
insofar as the court utilized the finding that the levies were not taxes so as to apply the ex-
emption from taxation under the Indian Act. The exemption was worded at that time in
the manner depicted in the text accompanying note 6 supra.
91. Montreal v. Blue-Feather (1933) 39 REvUE DE Jug. 100.
92. [1933] 3 W.W.R. 639 (Alta. Dist. Ct.). Such requirement may, however, be in
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Income Taxation
Both the federal and provincial governments impose income
tax, albeit the revenue is in the main collected by the federal
branch. The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and
Established Programs Financing Act 197791 provides for federal-
provincial collection agreements under which the federal govern-
ment collects provincial income tax, along with its own, in joint
federal-provincial tax returns. Agreements for the collection by
the federal government of the provincial tax on individuals have
been entered into by all the provinces except Quebec and
agreements for the collection of the tax on corporations by all the
provinces except Ontario and Quebec. Fundamental to such
agreements is a common tax base. The exemption conferred by
Section 87 of the Indian Act applies "notwithstanding any other
Act of the Parliament of Canada or any Act of the legislature of
a province" and is applicable in respect of both fiscs (treasuries).
The collection arrangements make clear that income tax levied
for provincial purposes is imposed under provincial jurisdiction,
rather than by a "renting" of that power to the federal govern-
ment, and accordingly the provincial tax is subject to being treaty
barred under Section 88 of the Indian Act.
Departmental Practice
The Department of National Revenue has announced its prac-
tice in the collection of federal and provincial income tax as
follows:
'While the exemption in the Indian Act refers to "property"
and the tax imposed under the Income Tax Act is a tax
calculated on the income of a person rather than a tax in
respect of his property, it is considered that the intention of the
Indian Act is not to tax Indians on income earned on a reserve.
Income earned by an Indian off a reserve, however, does not
come within this exemption, and is therefore subject to tax
under the Income Tax Act.
Section 87 exempts property "situated on a reserve" from taxa-
tion. The Department has declared:
conflict with Section 83(1)(a)(ii) empowering the band council to license businesses upon a
reserve.
93. S.C. 1976-77 c. 10.
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(g) The key factor in determining whether or not a specific
item of income received by an Indian is taxable or exempt is
the location where the income is earned. Income earned on a
reserve by an Indian is considered exempt. Income earned
away from the reserve is taxable.
(h) Different types of income have different criteria for
establishing whether they are on or off the reserve. Some of
the types of income may be classified as follows:
(i) Salary and wages are considered to be earned where the
services are performed. For an office worker this is the office
at or out of which his duties are performed; for a construction
worker employed on a project it is the job-site; for a teacher it
is the school and so on. The principal office of his employer,
the location where he is paid or from which the pay is issued
are not usually relevant in determining the location of income
from an office or employment. In some cases it will be found
that employment is partly on and partly off the reserve. In
these cases a reasonable allocation must be made between ex-
empt and taxable income, based on the facts of the particular
case.
(ii) Business income is normally allocable to the permanent
establishment. For example, for a self-employed merchant it
would be at his store.
(iii) Rental income is earned at the location of the property
rented.
(iv) Interest on a bank account is earned at the location at
which the funds are on deposit, i.e. the specific bank branch
address.
(v) Dividends on shares from a company whose head office,
principal business activity and share-register are on a reserve
will normally be considered to be earned on the reserve.
(vi) Income from other sources is generally considered to be
located at the payer's principal place of business for purposes
of determining whether or not it is on a reserve. This general
rule will apply to such amounts as annuity payments,
unemployment insurance benefits, old age security payments
and supplement, scholarships, bursaries, pension and Canada
Pension plan benefits.9 '
94. I.T. 62, Aug. 18, 1972, Department of National Revenue, Ottawa.
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The Established Jurisprudence
The practice of the Department may be ascribed to a series of
cases that established that income constituted personal property
and was exempt under Section 89(1) of the Indian Act or its
predecessor, if situated on a reserve, from "charge, pledge, mort-
gage, attachment, levy, seizure, duties or execution" by a non-
Indian. In Simkevitz v. Thompson" it was first acknowledged
that income might be regarded as a debt and accordingly as a
form of personal property to which the protection of the exempt-
ing provision could extend. The leading case is Petersen v. Cree,91
wherein the creditor sought to attach the wages of a member of
the -Oka Band of Indians whose domicile was on the reserve but
who resided and worked in Montreal. MacKinnon, J., held the
wages attachable and declared'that "personal property means all
property not immovable and includes chose-in-action."
The learned judge in Petersen v. Cree adopted the analysis of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Avery v. Cayuga" in
identifying the situs of the income. The Court of Appeal had
cryptically observed that "it seems not to be open to question"
that a bank deposit was "property situate outside of the reserve"
and therefore not exempt. The Court recited the leading Privy
Council cases9" in the establishment of the situs of personalty for
the purpose of succession and stamp duties. Lord Field described
such rules of situs:
Now a debt per se, although a chattel and part of the per-
sonal estate which the probato confers authority to administer,
has, of course, no absolute local existence; but it has been long
established in the Courts of this country, and is a well-settled
rule governing all questions as to which Court can confer the
required authority, that a debt does possess an attribute of
locality, arising from and according to its nature, and the
distinction drawn and well settled has been and is whether it is
a debt by contract or a debt by specialty. In the former case,
the debt being merely a chose in action-money to be
recovered from the debtor and nothing more-could have no
other local existence than the personal residence of the debtor
95. [1910] 16 O.W.R. 865 (Ont. C. Ct.).
96. [1941] 79 C.S. 1 (Que. S. Ct.).
97. [1913] 13 D.L.R. 275 (B.C.C.A.).
98. Commissioner of Stamps v. Hope, [1891] A.C. 476, 481-82 (P.C.); Lovitt v. The
King, 43 S.C.R. 106; The King v. Lovitt [1911] 28 T.L.R. 41 (P.C.).
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where the assets to satisfy it would presumably be, and it was
held therefore to be bona notabilia within the area of the local
jurisdiction within which he resided; but this residence is of
course of a changeable and fleeting nature, and depending
upon the movements of the debtor, and inasmuch as a debt
under seal or specialty had a species of corporeal existence by
which its locality might be reduced to a certainty, and was a
debt of a higher nature than one by contract, it was settled in
very early days that such a debt was bona notabilia where it
was "conspicuous," i.e., within the jurisdiction within which
the specialty was found at the time of death.99
In Petersen v. Cree, MacKinnon, J., regarded the income of the
defendant Indian as a simple contract debt that was located at the
"residence of the debtor": "The Court considers that
defendant's wages were earned in Montreal, they are primarily
payable there and are so situated. King v. Lovitt, Avery v.
Cayuga." It is considered that the practice of the Department is
directly attributable to the language of MacKinnon.
The rules of situs applied in Avery v. Cayuga allow Indian
bands to plan the economic development of reserve lands and
lands adjacent to it so as to avoid the imposition of personal in-
come tax. In Nowegifick v. The Queen10 the Development Cor-
poration of the Gull Bay Indian Reserve was engaged in logging
operations ten miles from the reserve. The plaintiff, a member of
the band, was employed by the corporation, which had its head
office located on the reserve. Mahoney, J., held that the wages
paid to the plaintiff constituted personal property situated on the
reserve which was not subject to charge.
Wages, once received, lose the character of wages and
become simply a negotiable instrument or money in their reci-
pient's hands. Only up to the point of receipt are they wages.
Wages are a contract debt, a chose in action, personal property
which, strictly speaking, has no situs; however, where the law
has found it necessary to attribute a situs to a debt, that situs
has been the debtor's residence.
It was not argued that the fact the services by which the
wages were earned were performed off the Gull Bay Reserve is
determinative of anything. No reason has occurred to me why
it should. The Corporation had but one residence: the Gull
99. 11891] A.C. 476, 481-82 (P.C.).
100. [1979] C.T.C. 195 (F.C.T.D.).
19791
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Bay Reserve. Wages payable by it to the Plaintiff were situated
there.
The judge affirmed the application of the statutory exemption to
income taxation:
The Income Tax Act does not, however, impose a tax on prop-
erty; it imposes a tax on persons. The question is whether taxa-
tion of the Plaintiff in an amount determined by reference to
his taxable income is taxation "in respect of" those wages
when they are included in the computation of his taxable in-
come. I think that it is.
The tax payable by an individual under the Income Tax Act
is determined by application of prescribed rates to his taxable
income calculated in the prescribed manner. If his taxable in-
come is increased by the inclusion of his wages in it, he will pay
more tax. The amount of the increase will be determined by
direct reference to the amount of those wages. I do not see that
such a process and result admits of any other conclusion than
that the individual is thereby taxed in respect of his wages. 10
The decision in Nowegijick demands a change in the practice of
the ]Department of National Revenue. It suggests that the em-
phasis must properly be focused upon the residence of the debtor
rather than the location at which the income is earned. Nowegi-
ick was in accord with The Queen v. National Indian
Brotherhood'0 2 decided a few months previously, in which Acting
Chief Justice Thurlow adopted the reasoning as to situs on or off
a reserve suggested in Avery v. Cayuga.
A Rational Notional Situs
The application of rules of situs to an aspect of property that
has no "absolute local existence" appears arbitrary and removed
from considerations of the purpose of the exemption. A rationale
proposed in this area should properly include the adoption of a
criterion that will encourage self-government and economic
development by Indian bands. Such a criterion has long existed in
the law adopted by the Canadian government in the taxation of
its subjects. The Canadian Income Tax Act purports to tax the
world income of residents in Canada and the active income, in-
cluding that derived from employment or business, of
101. Id. at 197.
102. Oct. 16, 1978 (F.C.T.D.).
[Vol. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss2/2
INDIANS AND TAXATION
nonresidents. 103 It seems appropriate to suggest that Indian bands
might properly aspire to tax the income of band members
wherever earned and the income of nonband members earned on
the reserve. Corresponding exemptions from taxation by federal
and provincial governments would complement such aspirations.
Judicial support for an exemption from taxation of Indians
residing upon a reserve is evident in the decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Armstrong Grocers'Assoc. v. Har-
ris,10 4 in which a creditor sought to attach monies owing to an In-
dian reserve farmer by an off-reserve purchaser of wheat. In an
opinion by MacDonald, J.A., the court held that the income was
not subject to charge:
The wheat while on the reserve, would not, I think, be sub-
ject to taxation, nor to process of execution, and I am of opin-
ion that the language of the Act does not render the proceeds
of it subject to taxation. It might, I do not say it would, be dif-
ferent where the Indian received the proceeds and deposited it,
say, in a bank outside the reserve, but here, the debtor was
obliged to seek his creditor at home on the reserve and pay him
there. But even apart from this technical rule, I think there is a
clear intention shown in the Act to exempt from taxation such
a chose in action as we have here. 1°o
The analysis employed in Avery v. Cayuga was considered and re-
jected by McPhillips and MacDonald. The denial of a charge
upon a debt owed to an Indian resident upon a reserve was af-
firmed in Crepin v. Delorimier et Banque. Canadienne
Nationale.06 Demers, J., observed that: "This deposit, it is a
credit-an incorporeal right-which by its nature has no point of
situs. If it must have one, it will be the domicile of the
creditor.' 0 7 The decision in Armstrong and Crepin may explain
the practice of the Department of National Revenue prior to
1967.
Residence
(e) Prior to 1967 the residence of an Indian, i.e. whether on or
off a reserve, was considered significant in determining
whether his income was taxable or not. This factor was in addi-
103. Section 2 Income Tax S.C. 1970-71-72 c. 63.
104. [1924] 1 W.W.R. 729 (B.C.C.A.).
105. Id. at 730.
106. [1930] 68 C.J. 36 (Que. S. Ct.).
107. Id. at 37.
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tion to the other criteria referred to in this bulletin, with the
result that all income earned by an Indian who lived off the
reserve was considered to be taxable income regardless of
where it was earned. Since 1967 no importance has been at-
tached to whether an individual Indian lived on or off the
reserve.
(f) The question of whether or not he is resident in Canada has
the same relevance for an Indian as for all other persons."0 8
The inconsistency of the reasoning employed in Armstrong
with that of Avery v. Cayuga is obvious. The analysis in Arm-
strong was rejected in Petersen v. Creel09 and, more recently, in
Snow v. The Queen" ' and The Queen v. National Indian
Brotherhood. ' I
In the latter case the Tax Review Board" 2 upheld the exemp-
tion of employees of that Indian organization who were
employed at the head office in Ottawa. Acting Justice Frost
declared:
I[I]n the present case, the facts are somewhat extraordinary,
and quite different from the Snow case referred to by counsel
for the respondent. Here a number of unenfranchised Indians
teraporarily leave their reserve to join the staff of the ap-
pellant, an organization of a purely non-commercial nature
acting on behalf of Indians and in respect of purely Indian af-
fairs, and financed by moneys appropriated for the Indian
cause by Parliament. Their domicile is their reserve and they
were certainly employed as members of their band. In no way
do I consider these people as having left the reserve to seek
their fortune and earn a living in the non-Indian society. One
could consider them as an extended arm of their bands,
operating in Ottawa at the convenience of Indian and non-
Indian parties concerned with the well-being and interests of
unenfranchised Indians. It seems to me that the Indian Act
should be interpreted and applied in a flexible way which does
justice to the underlying philosophy of the Act." 3
108. I.T.-62, Aug. 18, 1972, Department of National Revenue, Ottawa.
109. [1941] 79 C.J. 1 (Que. S. Ct.).
110. [1978] D.T.C. 6335 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd (1979) C.T.C. 227 (F.C.A.).
111. Oct. 16, 1978 (F.C.T.D.).
112. [1975] C.T.C. 2112 (T.R.B.).
113. Id. at 211.
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The Federal Court Trial Division decisively rejected such an ap-
proach and asserted: "There is no legal basis notwithstanding the
history of the exemption, and the special position of Indians in
Canadian society, for extending it by reference to any notional
extension of reserves or what may be considered as being done on
reserves." 1 4 The situs of the income and the application of the
exemption was determined by the rules set down in Commissioner
of Stamps v. Hope and Avery v. Cayuga.
Some judicial authority rejects not only the concept of exempt-
ing Indians according to residence, but any notional (theoretical)
concept of situs of property in the interpretation of Section 87.
This was emphatically declared by Kellock, J. (Abbot, J., concur-
ring) in the Supreme Court of Canada in Francis v. The QueenI5 :
"It is quite plain from this section that the actual situation of the
personal property on a reserve is contemplated by section [87]
and that any argument suggesting a notional situation is not
within the intentions of that section." The Court rejected a claim
for exemptions from federal customs and excise taxes imposed
upon importation of personal property by an Indian resident
upon a reserve. By rejecting any notional concept of situs, the
Court is challenging the application of the exemption of Section
87 to an "intangible" such as income.
A Statutory Situs
In 1951, Section 90116 was introduced into the Indian Act. The
section declares that:
Personal property that was
(a) purchased by Her Majesty with Indian moneys or moneys
appropriated by Parliament for the use and benefit of In-
dians or bands, or
(b) given to Indians or to a band under a treaty or agreement
between a band and Her Majesty, shall be deemed always
to be situated on a reserve.
In The Queen v. National Indian Brotherhood,117 it was con-
tended that, as the funding of the defendant's operation was
114. Oct. 16, 1978 (F.C.T.D.).
115. [1956] S.C.R. 618.
116. The origins of the provision may be traced to Section 69 of the Indian Act, c. 18,
which barred from seizure the "presents" or "annuities" of the Indians, and Civilization
and Enforcement of Indians Act, S.C. 1854 c. 4.
117. Oct. 16, 1978 (F.C.T.D.).
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largely provided by appropriations of Parliament for the use and
benefit of Indians, paragraph 90(l)(a) applied to the salaries of
the defendants' Indian employees so as to deem them to be prop-
erty situate on a reserve; it would follow that the individual In-
dian would be exempt from taxation with respect to his salary.
Thuirlow rejected the argument:
In my opinion, it is not possible to regard the salaries here in
question as "personal property that was purchased by Her Ma-
jesty" within the meaning of paragraph 90(l)(a) and I am un-
able to accept counsel's submission that the paragraph should
be interpreted as if it read "personal property that was ...
moneys appropriated by Parliament" as I think that gram-
matically the words "purchased by Her Majesty with" govern
the whole of the remainder of the paragraph. The provision
therefore cannot apply.118
The Court denied the application of Section 90(l)(a) to income
because it was not susceptible to description by adjectives ap-
propriate to tangible personalty.1 9 Income taxation was con-
sidered to be beyond the ambit of the extension of the exemption
conferred by Section 90(l)(a).
The "numbered" treaties between the Indians of western
Canada and the Crown provided that "Her Majesty agrees to
maintain schools for instruction in such reserves." Indian organ-
izations have argued that such terms and the oral assurances ac-
companying them place an obligation upon the Crown to support
Indian students in all forms of education. The Crown has pro-
vided such support pursuant to agreements between the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs and Indian bands. In Greyeyes v. The
Queen"' the Federal Court Trial Division held that a scholarship
paid to an Indian student by the Department of Indian Affairs to
attend a university off reserve lands was'deemed situate on a
reserve by the operation of the provisions of Section 90(l)(b).
The statement of agreed facts provided that "the said funds...
were given to her pursuant to an agreement and treaty between
the plaintiff's band and Ottawa and specifically pursuant to an
agreement to assist band members in their education in com-
pliance with the obligations of the Federal Government under
118. Id.
119. An approach adopted in Kuhn v. Starr, [1978] 4 C.N.L.B. 89 (Oct. 28, 1976,
Man. Q.B.).
120. [1978] 84 D.L.R.3d 196 (F.C.T.D.) presently under appeal to the Federal Court
of Appeal.
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Treaty #6." The decision suggests powerful arguments as to the
exemption of salaries paid by agreement and in contemplation of
treaty obligations to further the self-government and economic
development of Indian bands. It is doubtful that a Crown at-
torney will again agree that such salaries were "given under a
treaty or agreement," and the Crown is unlikely to miss the op-
portunity in the future to point to the inconsistency between Sec-
tion 90(1) (a) and (b) and suggest that both should properly be
confined to more tangible forms of personalty.' 21
But Is It Income Exempt Under Section 87? The Snow Case
The arguments of Indian organizations and the practice of the
Department of National Revenue have been questioned by the
Federal Court of Appeal. On April 19, 1979, in Snow v. The
Queen'22 the Court declared that income taxation was not subject
to the exemption of Section 87.
This position was judicially evident in 1956 in the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Francis v. The Queen.' 23 All
members of the Court rejected any notional concept of the situs
of personal property and in doing so doubted the application of
Section 87 to intangible property such as income. Rand, J. (Cart-
wright, J., concurring) observed with respect to that section's
predecessor: "To be taxed as by s. 102 'at the same rate as other
persons in the locality' refers obviously and only to personal or
real property under local taxation.' ' 2 The judge was clearly of
the opinion that the ambit of that exemption was confined to
local property taxation.
In 1972, Russell Snow, a member of the Caughnawga Indian
Band, challenged the imposition of taxation upon income earned
off the reserve. In November, 1974, Roland St. Onge, Q.C., for
the Tax Review Board, suggested that there was no exemption
from income taxation conferred by Section 87 irrespective of
where the income was earned.
Because the Income Tax Act taxes all the residents of Canada
and does not exclude the Indian as an actual taxpayer, and as
the Indian Act is completely silent on this important matter of
income tax, it is self-evident that an Indian falls under the In-
121. See obiter in Kuhn v. Starr, [1978] 4 C.N.L.B. 89 (Oct. 28, 1976, Man. Q.B.).
122. [1979] C.T.C. 227 (F.C.A.).
123. [1956] S.C.R. 618.
124. Id. at 632.
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come Tax Act, especially when his income is earned outside the
Reserve.'
In The Queen v. National Indian Brotherhood, decided four
months later, Frost, for the Tax Review Board, applied the ex-
emption of Section 87 to income taxation and offered this ex-
planation of his resolution of the dilemma:
Statutory law exempting Indians from taxation preceded, by
many years, the Income Tax Act, and established the broad
principle that all property of an Indian situated on a reserve is
exempt from taxation, thereby raising a presumption in law
that the Income Tax Act cannot be taken to apply to the prop-
erty of Indians on a reserve unless it is spelled out in clear
unambiguous language and there is no conflict. Although the
language of the Indian Act and the Income Tax Act appear to
be repugnant in respect of taxation, it cannot be supposed that
Parliament intended to contradict itself by exempting Indians
under the earlier legislation and then tearing up the earlier
statutes by imposing liabilities on them under the Income Tax
Act. Besides the question of repugnancy, the Indian Act is a
special Act which tends to be derogatory of the Income Tax
Act, which is a general taxing Act. To avoid collision between
these two statutes, the logical construction is simply that the
Income Tax Act as a general statute applies to Indians only in
respect of those areas of taxation wherein the Indian Act is
silent. The Indian Act, however, is not silent but speaks with
rather a loud voice, on the subject of taxability of Indians. The
appropriate sections read as follows [sections 87 and 90 are
recited]:
The language of the above provisions is broad and speaks to
exclude all other tax legislation, and thereby constitutes special
legislation overriding the Income Tax Act. It is only where the
Indian Act is silent that other statutes can affect the rights of
unenfranchised Indians.12 6
Upon appeal of both cases to the Federal Court Trial Division,
argtmient was confined to the question of situs of the income and
the Court was able, in the language of Thurlow in The Queen v.
National Indian Brotherhood,'27 to "assume that the taxation im-
posed by the Income Tax Act is taxation in respect of individuals
125. [1974] C.T.C. 2327 (T.R.B.).
126. [1975] C.T.C. 2112 (T.R.B.).
127. Oct. 16, 1978 (F.C.T.D.) and Snow v. The Queen [1978] D.T.C. 6335.
[Vol. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss2/2
INDIANS AND TAXATION
in respect of property and that a salary or a right to salary is
property." Shortly prior thereto a fellow judge of the Trial Divi-
sion had found that a scholarship did constitute "property"
within the exemption of Section 87 in the face of the argument
that "the Income Tax Act levies a tax on persons, not on prop-
erty." Mahoney, in Greyeyes v. The Queen,'28 however, refused
to accept the soundness of the Crown's position in citing Sura v.
M.N.R. 2 9 wherein Mr. Justice Taschereau for the Supreme
Court of Canada observed:
Nothing in subsequent amendments of the [Income Tax] Act
changes the rule that it is not ownership of property which is
taxable, but that tax is imposed on a taxpayer ....
As Mignault J. [said] in McLeod v. Minister of Customs:3
"All of this is in accord with the general policy of the Act
which imposes the Income Tax on the persons and not on the
property."
The Federal Court of Appeal was not as reticent as the Trial
Division. In M.N.R. v. Iroquois of Caughnawaga,'31 Chief
Justice Jackett (Pratte, J., and Hyde, D.J., concurring on this
matter) declared that the obligation of an employer to pay
statutory unemployment insurance premiums is not "'taxation on
property' within the ambit of section 87." 132 The Chief Justice
commented:
From one point of view, all taxation is directly or indirectly
taxation on property; from another point of view, all taxation
is directly or indirectly taxation on persons. It is my view,
however, that when section 87 exempts "personal property of
an Indian or band situated on a reserve" from "taxation," its
effect is to exempt what can properly be classified as direct tax-
ation on property. The courts have had to develop
jurisprudence as to when taxation is taxation on property and
when it is taxation on persons for the purposes of subsection
92(2) of the British North America Act, 1867, and there would
seem to be no reason why such jurisprudence should not be ap-
plied to the interpretation of section 87 of the Indian Act. See,
128. [19781 84 D.L.R.3d 146 (F.C.T.D.).
129. [19611 32 D.L.R.2d 282, 283-84, [19621 S.C.R. 65.
130. [1917-27] C.T.C. 290, 296.
131. [1977] C.T.C. 49.
132. Id. at 50.
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for example, with reference to subsection 92(2). Provincial
Treasurer of Alberta v. Kerr.I33
The Chief Justice asserted that the exemption conferred by Sec-
tion 87 should be confined to indirect taxation.'34 The
jurisprudence the learned judge refers to distinguishes direct and
indirect taxation for the purpose of determining whether it is
within provincial competence under Section 92(2) of the British
North America Act. 35 The arbitrary character of this suggestion
is apparent in the confusion of the learned judge in equating in-
direct taxation with taxation on property after first asserting that
the exemption of Section 87 is confined to "direct taxation on
property." A more substantial objection resides in the language
employed upon the adoption of the exemption in the 1876 Indian
Act. If it was intended that the distinction suggested by the Chief
Justice should be applied in the interpretation of the exemption
introduced nine years after the British North America Act was
passed, surely the "direct" and "indirect" language of that
statute would have been employed' A perhaps fatal objection to
the analysis of the Chief Justice is the specific exemption from
succession duty conferred by Section 87. Succession duty was
considered by the Privy Council to be a direct form of taxation in
the case relied upon by the Chief Justice, Provincial Treasurer of
Alberta v. Kerr.3 "
Doubts as to the soundness of the rationale offered by the
Chief Justice may explain the brevity of the judgment of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Snow v. The Queen.'37 In a stun-
ningly brief judgment, Justice Le Dain observed:
We are all of the view that the appeal must be dismissed on
the ground that the tax imposed on the appellant under the In-
come Tax Act, is not taxation in respect of personal property
within the meaning of section [87] of the Indian Act. In our
opinion section [87] contemplates taxation in respect of
specific personal property qua property and not taxation in
respect of taxable income as defined by the Income Tax Act,
which, while it may reflect items that are personal property, is
not itself personal property but an amount to be determined as
133. [1933] A.C. 710 (P.C.).
134. [1977] C.T.C. 50, 51.
135. See text accompaning notes 54-55 supra.
136. [1933] A.C. 710 (P.C.).
137. [1979] C.T.C. 277 (Fed. C.A.).
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a matter of calculation by application of the provisions of the
Act.138
The dramatic curtailment of an exemption recognized throughout
the history of the administration of income taxation demands
greater explanation.
An examination of the history of taxation in Canada, as found
in the earlier part of this article, offers some explanation of the
ambiguity presented by Section 87. The exemption from taxation
introduced in 1876 was, and has continued to be, confined to
"property." Federal income taxation was not levied until 1917,139
and even then it was thought to be temporary. The rigidity of the
Indian Act throughout its history may explain the failure to
amend its language so as to accommodate changing forms of tax-
ation, 14 0 including income taxation. The 1876 exemption repealed
the exemption conferred by the Province of Canada in 1850,
which was not restricted to "property,"' 41 and the Parliament of
1941 in a clarification of its extent did not alter the focus on
"property."
A significant guide to the intent of Parliament in the enactment
of the modem form of the exemption is presented in the debates
in the House of Commons concerning the requirement of a
waiver of the exemption before an Indian might vote in a federal
election. 4 2 The debates proceeded on the assumption that the
taxation from which the waiver of the exemption was sought was
income taxation. This is easy to understand insofar as federal in-
come taxation was by far the most significant form of taxation to
which the Indians might be subject, and the only form that might
explain attaching the federal franchise to the imposition thereof.
In an area of ambiguity it is appropriate to consider the
assurances of the Treaty Commissioner. As the United States
Supreme Court declared in United States v. Powers1 43 : "If possi-
ble, legislation subsequent to the Treaty must be interpreted in
138. Id. at 227.
139. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra. The income taxes levied in British Col-
umbia in 1876 and Prince Edward Island in 1894 were minimal and not considered signifi-
cant in the determination of parliamentary intent. Also see Saskatchewan Indian "Our
Way" (1973).
140. See Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 581 (1978).
141. See text accompanying notes 1-2.
142. See the section on Franchise and Taxation; supra, at notes 24-44.
143. [1939] 59 S. Ct. 344.
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harmony with its plain purposes." And as Cartwright, J., ob-
served in The Queen v. George144 :
In St. Saviour's Southward (Churchwardens) case, 14 Lord
Coke said:
"If two constructions may be made of the King's grant, then
the rule is, when it may receive two constructions, and by force
of one construction the grant may according to the rule of law
be adjudged good, and by another it shall by law be adjudged
bad; then for the King's honour, and for the benefit of the
subject, such construction shall be made that the King's
charter shall take effect, for it was not the King's intent to
make a void grant."
We should, I think, endeavour to construe the treaty of 1827
and those Acts of Parliament which bear upon the question
before us in such manner that the honour of the Sovereign may
be upheld and Parliament not made subject to the reproach of
having taken away by unilateral action and without considera-
tion the rights solemnly assured to the Indians and their
posterity by treaty. 146
The language of Section 87 has been consistently judicially con-
strued to extend to income as a form of "property"; if there is an
ambiguity it appears subject to construction in favor of both the
"King's honour" and the Indians.
The practice of the Department of National Revenue since the
introduction of income taxation and the understanding of the In-
dians derived therefrom do not support the change suggested by
the Federal Court of Appeal. Neither the Department of National
Revenue nor the Indians have ever doubted the application of the
exemption to the taxation of income.
One may refer to the inappropriate benefits conferred upon
provincial treasuries. The decision of the Federal Court of Ap-
peal would permit a provincial levy on all income earned in the
province, including Indian reserves, in spite of the lack of
jurisdiction of the provincial governments in important spheres to
provide services to reserves. Provincial governments do not ac-
cept financial responsibility for education, health, or social ser-
vices of Indians on reserves and yet would claim revenue derived
144. [19661 S.C.R. 267.
145. [1613] 10 Co. Rep. 366, 66b, 77 E.R. 1025, 1027.
146. [1966] S.C.R. 267.
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therefrom without any obligation to provide the services upon
which such revenue is customarily expended.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, a consideration
of such factors is surely necessary to the case's disposition. A
construction of Section 87 of the Indian Act must be adopted
with regard to the purposes of that statute, rather than mere em-
phasis upon a literal interpretation of the charging provisions of
the Income Tax Act.
Real Property Taxation
Section 87 declares that the "interest of an Indian or a band in
a reserve or surrendered lands" is exempt from taxation and "no
Indian or band is subject to taxation in respect of the ownership,
occupation, provision or use of any [such] property." The ex-
emption clearly includes local property taxation.' 7 Local real
property taxation under provincial jurisdiction provides the ma-
jor source of funding for local services provided by urban and
rural municipalities in Canada and is normally assessed on the
basis of the value of the land occupied. Services are not provided
by municipalities on reserves. The exemption conferred upon In-
dians and bands by Section 87 allows for taxation by a band
authorized to do so by Section 83(l)(a).
Taxation of reserves and surrendered lands occupied by non-
Indians presents a remarkably different legal and fiscal result.
Albeit services are not provided by the municipalities in respect of
the taxes collected, a consistent line of authority has upheld
municipal real property taxation of non-Indian occupation of
reserve lands."" In the leading case of City of Vancouver v.
Chow Chee,49 the British Columbia Court of Appeal adopted the
explanation of Viscount Haldane in Smith v. Vermillion Hills."'
"[Although the appellant is sought to be taxed in respect of his
occupation of land the fee of which is in the Crown, the opera-
147. Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 618, per Rand, J.
148. Commissaires d'ecoles du Canton de Manivaki v. Brady, [1928] 66 R.I.Q. 41
(Que. S. Ct.) (school taxes imposed upon non-Indian occupier of reserve); City of Van-
couver v. Chow Chee, [1941] 1 W.W.R. 72 (B.C.C.A.) (municipal taxation of non-Indian
enter off of reserve land; Provincial Municipal Assessor v. Rural Municipality of Har-
rison, [1971] 3 W.W.R. 735 (Man. Q.B.) (municipal taxation of non-Indian lessee of
reserve land); Sammantino v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 24
(B.C.C.A.) (provincial property taxation of non-Indian occupier of reserve land).
149. [1942] 1 W.W.R. 72 (B.C.C.A.).
150. [19161 2 A.C. 569, 574 (P.C.).
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tion of the statute imposing the tax is limited to the appellant's
own interest." Local property taxes are construed as a tax upon
the occupier's interest, not upon the land itself, despite the reduc-
tion in "the power of the federal government and the band coun-
cil to control and direct economic development activity on Indian
reserve land.""'  Macdonald, J.A., for the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, dismissed as immaterial "the contention that
the lands in question would necessarily bring a lower rental if the
occupant is subject to taxation, than they would otherwise
bring."11" 2 Section 87 appears to have been drafted in 1951 so as
to accommodate the existing jurisprudence and only exempt the
"interest of an Indian or a band" and not that of a non-Indian
occupier.
The nature of the Indian Act is such that a non-Indian may only
secure an occupier's interest in reserve lands. Accordingly, any
attempt to impose a tax upon an interest other than that of an oc-
cupier of reserve lands must fail. In Kamsack v. Canadian Nor-
thern Town Properties, 1 3 an attempt to recover taxes assessed
upon the non-Indian occupant as "owner" of surrendered but
unsold reserve lands was rejected. Similarly, in Sammartino v.
Attorney General of British Columbia,"4 school taxes could not
be levied upon the non-Indian lessee of reserve lands as "owner"
thereof.
The application of provincial property taxation to non-Indian
occupiers of reserve lands is, as indicated, supported by substan-
tial judicial authority. Provincial governments have not,
however, always chosen to impose or allow the imposition of
such taxation. Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan bar municipal
taxation of non-Indian occupants of reserve lands. In 1968 the
Alberta legislature bluntly declared: "An Indian reserve is not a
part of a municipality for any purpose whatsoever."'5" Saskat-
chewan introduced similar legislation in 1972.116 Ontario express-
ly denied municipal taxation of non-Indian occupants of reserve
151. Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs: Submission to the Province of British
Columbia on the Relationship of Indian Reserves to Provincial Laws relating to Local
Government and Taxation (1974).
152. [1942] 1 W.W.R. 72, 74 (B.C.C.A.).
153. [1924] 4 D.L.R. 824 (Can. S. Ct.).
154. [19721 1 W.W.R. 24 (B.C.C.A.).
155. Municipal Government Act, S.A. 1968 c. 68 s. 6, R.S.A. 1970 c. 246 s. 6.
156. Rural Municipalities Act, S.S. 1972 c. 101, R.S.S. 1978 c. R-26 s. 5(b). See also
Urban Municipalities Act, S.S. 1970 c. 78, R.S.S. 1978 c. U-10 s. 347 (no Indian reserves
located adjacent to or within the boundaries of urban municipalities in Saskatchewan).
[Vol. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss2/2
INDIANS AND TAXATION
lands in 1973.157 Legislation in British Columbia, Manitoba,
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island excludes taxation of
reserve lands but permits taxation of non-Indian occupants
thereof.'" Legislation in New Brunswick and Quebec provides no
reference or restriction upon the taxation of reserve lands.' 19 The
taxation of non-Indian occupants of reserve lands has presented
the most severe problems in British Columbia, where they were
exacerbated by the action of the provincial government in 1973 in
reorganizing municipal boundaries so as to include reserve lands
in many instances. A member of the Kamloops Indian Band in
that province described the difficulty:
The situation of my Band illustrates the seriousness of the
problem as it affects economic and self-reliance. The
Kamloops Indian Band has developed an industrial park over
the past 12 to 15 years which, when fully developed, will en-
compass about 500 acres of Band land. In addition, there are
substantial portions of individually owned lands, bringing the
overall total acreage to approximately 1,000 acres. At the pre-
sent time, the Province of British Columbia levies property
taxes on both buildings and lands, under the taxation act,
against all of non-Band occupants of reserve lands. This has
been occurring since the inception of the development of the
park, and continues to 1978.
The only exclusion from the provincial taxing of our lessees
was a three-year period when the industrial park was included
within the boundaries of the City of Kamloops, and the city
levied even higher taxes during this period of time. The City of
Kamloops, when we were within their boundary gave us no ser-
vices. They didn't even pick up our garbage. I would estimate
that over the past 12-15 years, approximately 1.6 million in
taxes has been collected from the lessees in our industrial park.
The total monies that have been expended by a combination of
provincial government and the City of Kamloops, on providing
services, or improvements of any kind, has been about 15
thousand dollars and fire protection provided by the City of
157. Act to Amend Assessment Act, S.O. 1973 c. 26. See Riley, Winning at Saugeen,.
2 RjKA (1976).
158. Municipal Act, R.S.B.C. 1960 c. 255 s. 327(l)(f); Municipal Assessment Act,
R.S.N.S. 1967 c. 14; Real Property Tax Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974 c. R-6.
159. Assessment Act, S.N.B. A-15; Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q. 1964 c. 193.
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K amloops for the three years that the park was in the boun-
daries of the city.'"
Such provincial taxation policies are a clear obstacle to effective
self-government and economic development upon reserve lands.
As observed in the Fields-Stanbury Report:
Indians continue to fail to obtain maximum potential benefit
from their reserve lands when they lease them to non-Indians.
The effects of such leases is that the rents received by the Band
are reduced by the amount of taxes paid by the lessee to the
municipality or the Province.' 6'
It is suggested that a more generous interpretation of Section
87 might more properly reflect the intent of Parliament in the
furtherance of self-government by Indian bands in construing the
exemption so as to bar taxation of the interest of non-Indian oc-
cupants of reserve lands. 2 It is, however, considered that the
draftsmen adopted the language of Section 87 so as to recognize
the existing taxation of non-Indian occupants. This conclusion
suggests the necessity for the amendment of Section 87 so as to
facilitate Indian self-government and taxation under some
authority such as that described in Section 83, which specifically
recognizes the subjection of Indian occupants thereto.
Sales Taxation
Situ.F of Transaction Determines Exemption
Section 87 provides that "the personal property of an Indian or
band situated on a reserve" is exempt from taxation, and no "In-
dian or band is subject to taxation in respect of the ownership,
occupation, possession or use" thereof. The application of the
exemption to taxes levied upon sales transactions must be con-
sidered to be subject to the ruling in Francis v. The Queen.' 3 The
federal Customs Act imposed a tax upon the importer of goods
from a foreign jurisdiction at the point of entry into Canada.
160. Minutes of the Taxation Workshop, Jan. 1978, Edmonton, Alberta, National In-
dian Brotherhood, Mary Leonard, band member.
161. FIELDS & STANBURY, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PUBLIC SECTOR UPON INDIANS OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver, 1973).
162. Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, Submission to the Province of British
Columbia on Relationship of Indian reserves to Provincial loss relating to Local Govern-
ment and Taxation (1974).
163. [1956] S.C.R. 618. See also Pope v. Paul [1957] 2 W.W.R. 449 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
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The importation was in respect of household appliances which
were taken directly to the Indian importer's home on a reserve.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously declared that Sec-
tion 87 afforded no exemption because, in the words of Chief
Justice Kerwin (Taschereau and Fauteux, JJ., concurring):
"clause (b) of section [87] of the Indian Act does not apply,
because customs duties are not taxes upon the personal property
of an Indian situated on a reserve but are imposed upon the im-
portation of goods into Canada." 16 Rand, J. (Carwright, J.,
concurring), observed: "in section [87(1)], property 'situated on a
reserve' is unequivocal and does not mean property entering this
country or passing an international boundary."' 65 Kellock, J.
(Abbot, J., concurring), bluntly commented: "Before the prop-
erty here in question could become situated on a reserve, it had
become liable to customs duty at the border. There has been no
attempt to impose any other tax."'16 6 The reasoning employed by
the Supreme Court of Canada appears directly applicable to the
imposition of sales tax at the point of sale off a reserve. In the
vast majority of sales transactions involving Indian purchases in
Canada, the sale takes place off the reserve, and according to
Francis, are not subject to the exemption conferred by Section
87.
The analysis employed in Francis is in accord with the reason-
ing of the Quebec Superior Court some years earlier in Delisle v.
Shawingan Water & Power Co. 167 The court denied an exemption
to an Indian resident of a reserve from the imposition of a federal
sales tax upon electricity furnished to the band member's home.
Demers, J., in a confusing judgment, decided inter alia that the
tax was of a type that was "levied upon commodities before they
reach the consumer" and "[Indians] cannot pretend that any tax
is being imposed on their real or personal property."'' The judge
apparently considered that the tax was imposed off the reserve in-
sofar as it was collected from the power company, even though
"the buyer must pay for the increase of the cost."
Not Personal Property Within Section 87
The rationale adopted by Demers to explain the conclusion that
the tax was levied off the reserve, and therefore was not exempt,
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. [1941] 4 D.L.R. 556 (Que. S. Ct.).
168. Id. at 560 (the judge's own italics).
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appears to have been sufficiently unconvincing to provoke a later
judge to offer an alternative explanation for such denial. In
Lillian Brown v. Attorney General of British Columbia,"6 9 in cir-
cunstances very similar to those in Delisle, MacDonald, J.,
declared that although electricity was personal property, it was
not "personal property" within the meaning of Section 87. In a
strained attempt to avoid the consequences of finding electricity
to be personal property in the general law, the learned judge
devised a special meaning for that concept referable to the Indian
Act. MacDonald observed:
Favouring the interpretation urged on behalf of the plaintiffs
[Indians] is the Indian Act as a whole. It is a paternalistic
statute, making many special provisions for Indians. As was
stated by Rand, J. in St. Anne's Island Shooting and Fishing
Club Limited v. The King,1 71
"The language of the Statute embodies the accepted view
that these aborigines are, in- effect, wards of the State,
whose care and welfare are a political trust of the highest
obligation."
But it is clear that Parliament has not gone so far as to say
that an Indian residing on a reserve is not subject to any tax or
duty. Notwithstanding s. 87, if he imports goods without pay-
ing customs duties, and takes those goods to his home on the
reserve, he is liable for those duties. Francis v. The Queen. If
in British Columbia he leaves the reserve and purchases tangi-
ble personal property, he will be liable for tax under the Social
Services Tax Act on the same basis as any other purchaser....
There is another consideration which I think provides an in-
dication of the legislators' intent. Electricity is intangible. It is
not a chose in action and it is not property capable of being
subject of a succession. When s. 87 goes on to provide the per-
sonal property talked about is not to be subject to succession
duty, inheritance tax or estate duty, it suggests that what is
contemplated is property which, might otherwise, be subject to
such levies.1 7 1
MacDonald sought to buttress his conclusion by reference to the
seemingly irrelevant considerations that the plaintiffs must prove
169. B.C. TAX REP. 200-103, Apr. 28, 1978 (B.C. S. Ct.).
170,. [1950] S.C.R. 211, 219.
171. B.C. TAX REP. 200-103, Apr. 28, 1978 (B.C. S. Ct.) p. 10 of 11.
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as a matter of evidence that they came within the exemption and
that preference should be given to a construction that will avoid a
constitutional collision. The only substantial reason offered by
the trial judge in restricting the ambit of Section 87 to tangible
property is the reference therein to "succession duty, inheritance
tax or estate duty." It is submitted that the structure of the sec-
tion is incompatible with such an analysis. The reference to named
taxes in Section 87 appears as a mere partial particularization of
the application of the section. MacDonald's analysis appears to
be a classic example of the misapplication of the "expressio
unius, est exclusio alterius" rule of construction of the type re-
jected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Turgeon v. Dominion
Band.17 2 A rejection of MacDonald's approach is supported by
an examination of the history of the exemption from taxes con-
ferred in the Indian Act. 173 Until the 1951 revision no such argu-
ment as tendered by MacDonald could have been maintained,
and it is not considered that the amendment sought to restrict its
historic ambit but rather to clarify its application. Surely a sales
tax on electricity is readily encompassed by the language of a sec-
tion which declares that "no Indian or band is subject to taxation
in respect of the . . use of [personal] property." 17 4
Sales of Personal Property On a Reserve
Francis v. The Queen denied an exemption from federal
customs duties because the tax was levied before the property was
situate on a reserve. The case would seem to lend substantial
authority to the notion that sales conducted upon a reserve can-
not be the subject of taxation imposed upon an Indian purchaser.
In Rex v. Groslouis'"7 it was declared that the Quebec Retail Sales
Tax Act could not be applied to such transactions. The judge
observed:
172. [1930] S.C.R. 67. See DIREDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 100 (Butterworths,
Toronto, 1974).
173. See the section on Canadian Indian Legislation and Policy, supra at notes 1-10.
174. But see Crepin v. Delormier, [1930] 68 c. 536 (Que. S. Ct.), where Demers, J.,
observed that: "I am of the opinion that section 102 [now Section 87] has in view only a
tax on immoveables and corporeal moveables situated without the territorial limits of the
reserve." In a judgment delivered on Dec. 6, 1979, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
overturned the decision of MacDonald, J., in Lillian Brown. The judgment is not yet
available but is understood to accept electricity as "property" which Section 87 exempts
from imposition of a sales tax when delivered on a reserve.
175. [1943] 81 C.C.C. 167 (Que. J.P.). See also Attorney General for Quebec v.
Williams, [1944] 82 C.C.C. 166 (Que. J.P.).
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[I]t is clear that the property of an Indian, whether real or
personal, can only be taxed if such property is outside the
reserve ...
If the Indian, a merchant, only sells to Indians inhabiting his
reserve, it would be logical to conclude that the Attorney
General of the Province cannot demand legally of this Indian,
a merchant, that he comply with [the registration requirements
of the Tax Act].
*.. I must say that the Indian not being liable to be taxed
for his chattels, the provincial sales tax does not apply to the
Indian, a merchant .... 376
The court went on to hold that the tax was payable by non-
Indians who purchased goods on the reserve, 77 who, of course,
are not exempted by Section 87. The conclusion in Groslouis is of
considerable significance to the operation of bands' and
Hudson's Bay Company stores on reserves and suggests that sales
tax 4annot be imposed upon Indian purchases thereat. It was
assumed to be correct in the recent decision in Kinookimaw
Beach Assoc. v. The Queen.178
Sales, Tax Legislation and Administrative Practice
Sales taxes were introduced by the provinces in the Depression
and have generally been levied by legislation or administrative
practice so as to exempt Indian "purchases for consumption or
use on a reserve.' ' 179 The legislation and regulations that have
been introduced in Manitoba (1974), New Brunswick (1974),
Nova Scotia (1973), Ontario, Prince Edward Island (1978), and
Quebec (1974) have all followed such an approach. 80 The provi-
sion in the Manitoba Retail Sales Tax Act is typical:
176. Id. at 170, 173.
177. Id. at 173.
178. Unreported, June 28, 1979 (Sask. C.A.), [1978] 6 W.W.R. 749 (Sask. Q.B.). The
facts do not clearly indicate where the sales were completed, on or off the reserve. It may
be that a broader construct of the decision is appropriate insofar as Chief Justice Culliton
in the Court of Appeal merely indicates that the goods were produced for the Associa-
tion's "own use or consumption."
179. Opinion of Deputy Attorney General of Saskatchewan, July 9, 1937, in response
to an enquiry by the Hudson's Bay Company.
180. New Brunswick Social Services and Education Tax Act, R.S.N.B. 1973 c. S-10,
as amended by S.N.B. 1974 c. 83, section 11.1:
"11.1(1) Goods, other than prepared meals, spirits, wine, beer or accommodations
that
"(a) are purchased by an Indian as defined in the Indian Act, Chapter 1-6 of the
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Exempt purchases by Indians-Notwithstanding section 3,
no tax is payable under this Act in respect of tangible personal
property
(a) that is purchased by an Indian
(i) on a reserve for consumption or use by an Indian on a
reserve, or
(ii) off a reserve for consumption or use by an Indian on
a reserve if the tangible personal property is delivered
Revised Statutes of Canada 1970,
"(b) have a value of less than three hundred dollars, and
"(c) are delivered to a reserve, are exempt from taxation.
"(2) An Indian purchasing goods of a value of three hundred dollars or more for
delivery to a reserve may obtain a refund of tax paid by him on such goods by applying
for a refund in accordance with the regulations."
Nova Scotia Health Services Tax Act, R.S.N.S. 1967 c. 126, as amended by S.N.S.
1973 c. 35. Section 10(a)(b) excludes: "tangible personal property, when delivered to and
consumed or used on a reserve as defined by the Indian Act, Chapter 1-6 of the Revised
Statutes Canada, 1970, and motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Act
and a snow vehicle within the meaning of the Snow Vehicles Act, when such tangible per-
sonal property, motor vehicle or snow vehicle is purchased or used by an Indian whose
name is entered in the Band List as provided by the said Indian Act."
Ontario Retail Sales Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 415. Section 5 excludes:
"64. tangible personal property situated on a reserve, as defined by the Indian Act
(Canada) or by the Minister when purchased by an Indian, and tangible personal property
purchased by an Indian off the reserve when delivered to the reserve for consumption or
use by an Indian:
"65. taxable services used on a reserve, as defined by the Indian Act (Canada) or by
the Minister, when purchased by an Indian; ..."
Prince Edward Island Revenue Tax Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974 c. R-14 as amended by
S.P.E.I. 1978 c. 20. Section 10(2):
"(2) Exemption for Indians,-A consumer who is an Indian as defined in the Indian
Act, R.S.C. 1970, Cap. 1-6 is not liable to pay the tax in respect of the purchase of goods,
other than prepared meals, spirits, wines or beer, that are to be consumed on a reserve."
Quebec Retail Sales Tax Act, R.S.Q. 1964 c. 71 Reg. O.C. 2244:
"2.01 The following are exempt from the retail sales tax:
"(a) the retail sale of any moveable property made on a reserve between Indian or to
an Indian; and
"(b) the retail sale of any moveable property other than a motor vehicle made to an
Indian outside a reserve, if the property is delivered on the reserve by the vendor, to be
consumed or used thereon by that Indian. ...
"3.01 Where a motor vehicle is sold retail to an Indian by a vendor outside the
reserve, the Indian must pay the vendor the tax on the purchase of such property.
"3.02 An Indian who has paid the tax contemplated in section 3.01 may obtain a re-
fund of this tax by making an application to the Minister to that effect and submitting
documentary evidence of his status as an Indian within the meaning of this Regulation, of
the fact that the vehicle in question was bought for his personal use or for the use, at his
expense, of any other person and that he has paid the tax contemplated in section 3.01."
Note that Alberta imposes no sales tax on goods generally.
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by the seller to the reserve or shipped by the seller by
common carrier for delivery to the reserve, and
(b) that is not
(i) a motor vehicle as that word is defined in The
Highway Traffic Act, or
(ii) tangible personal property which in the opinion of the
minister is for commercial use, or
(ii) liquor as that word is defined in The Liquor Control
Act. 181
The provincial legislation generally exempts sales of personal
property that are to be delivered to a reserve for consumption or
use on the reserve. Such an exemption would necessarily include
most sales made upon a reserve to Indian purchasers.
Nova Scotia has extended its legislative exemption by an ad-
ministrative practice so as to exempt Indian purchases of prop-
erty that is not delivered to the reserve where an exemption cer-
tificate indicating band membership is presented. Saskatchewan,
which has not legislated upon the subject, exempts purchases by
Indians on or off the reserve irrespective of the place of delivery.
By contrast, British Columbia, which also has no legislation
specifically concerned with the exemption of Indians, has by ad-
ministrative practice exempted only sales made to an Indian pur-
chaser at a store located on a reserve. 182 No exemption for sales
off a reserve for delivery to a reserve has been allowed.
British Columbia policy appears most in accord with the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Francis v. The Queen.
The approach of the other provinces appears to be based on
historic practice and caution in the exercise of their constitutional
jurisdiction to levy direct sales taxation. The validity of provincial
sales taxation is confined to its imposition in respect of "pur-
chases for consumption or use" in which circumstances the tax
181. R.S.M. 1970 C.R. 150, as amended by S.M. 1974 c. 57, § 4(12).
182. Letter by Social Services Tax Commissioner to Union of British Columbia Indian
Chiefs, dated Aug. 29, 1973: "You will appreciate the fact that there is no specific exemp-
tion under the Act [The Social Services Act, not the Indian Act] for purchases made by
Indians on or off the reserve. Notwithstanding this, there is a special administrative provi-
sion whereby Indians residing on the Reserve may purchase goods tax-free from a store
located on the reserve. This has not been extended to include electricity or telephone ser-
vices. ...."
In an earlier letter dated July 17, 1973, the Commissioner stated: "Sales made by a
store not located on a Reserve to Indians on a reserve, even though they may be delivered
to the Indian's home, are not covered by this administrative exemption." (Emphasis add-
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cannot be passed on. Several provinces have adopted the situs of
the "consumption or use" as determinative of the situs of the
product purchased for the purpose of the exemption under Sec-
tion 87. It is suggested that the rules of situs developed under Sec-
tion 87 of the Indian Act should not be modified by the con-
straints of the criterion developed to distinguish "direct" and
"indirect" taxation. The constitutional authority of the provinces
to levy sales taxation would not be overextended by taxation of
purchases made off a reserve for "consumption or use" on a
reserve. The constitutional validity of the taxation depends upon
its inability to be "passed on" and not upon any situs where the
''consumption or use" takes place.
At the present time the exemption established by the majority
of provinces in regard to sales tax would likely be viewed as more
"generous" than that of British Columbia. It should, however,
be recognized that in the future the decision in Francis v. The
Queen and the policy of British Columbia would offer a powerful
incentive to the development of stores on reserves. Francis v. The
Queen seemingly suggests that the exemption would apply to any
sale made upon a reserve, irrespective of place of delivery, which
would surely encourage Indians to purchase on reserve rather
than off.
Sales taxes are levied upon all forms of tangible and intangible
personal property by the provinces. The provinces have not,
however, applied the exemption demanded by Section 87 to a
similar degree. In the main, liquor, tobacco, gasoline, electricity,
and telephone services are excluded from the exemption, as in
Alberta, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec.' 3
Saskatchewan" ' and New Brunswick differ only in including
telephone services within the exemption. Ontario, in addition to
exempting telephone services, exempts liquor, and has introduced
a trial program whereby taxes are not levied upon gasoline
delivered to a reserve. Nova Scotia includes within the exemption
liquor, tobacco, telephone services, and electricity, but not
gasoline. At the other extreme, Manitoba denies the application
of the exemption to motor vehicles and commercial property. The
varieties of property considered by the provinces to be excluded
from Section 87 are clearly not dictated by the language of that
183. British Columbia policy in this regard is not known.
184. On account of administrative difficulties, Saskatchewan exempts the actual ren-
tal of a telephone located on a reserve and taxes all long distance toll charges.
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section nor by the judgments of the member of the Supreme
Court in Francis v. The Queen. It is suggested that the collection
of such taxes in relation to a sale conducted upon a reserve con-
stitutes a clear violation of Section 87, and in respect to items
consumed on a reserve but not sold there, a deviation from the
opinion and provincial practice that would generally exempt such
items.
The objections to extending the exemption to the excluded
items generally cited relate to administrative difficulties, the
degree of loss of revenue to the fisc, and the conclusion that the
items are largely consumed off the reserve. 8 Liquor and tobacco
taxes are also supported as discouraging undue consumption."16
Considering the absence of stores, service stations, and liquor
outlets on many reserves, it might be appropriate to view the im-
position of taxes upon such items as a compromise by both In-
dians and governments of the Francis decision, so as to spread
the benefit of the exemption among all Indians, not merely those
who are fortunate enough to be members of a band that possesses
such facilities.
The federal Excise Tax Act'87 imposes a tax upon the sale price
of goods produced or manufactured in Canada or imported into
Canada. The tax is levied upon the manufacturer or importer.
The federal government does not consider that the tax is subject
to the exemption of Section 87 since, relying on Francis v. The
Queen, it is levied off the reserve. Pursuant to a 1976 amendment,
Indian bands are considered to constitute "municipalities"' 188
within the meaning of the Act and are therefore able to take ad-
vantage of exemptions relating to goods purchased in the provi-
sion of municipal services.
Subject to Treaty
Section 88 of the Indian Act provides that provincial taxing
legislation can only apply to Indians "subject to the terms of any
treaty." It has been often asserted by Indians and Indian
185. Such a comment in relation to liquor appears particularly opportunistic insofar
as Section 94 of the Indian Act prohibits the sale of liquor or the establishment of a bar
on a reserve and Section 95 provides for prohibition on a reserve in the absence of
referendum of the band members favoring a "wet" reserve.
186. Director of Revenue, Saskatchewan, quoted as suggesting that the exemption to
liquor sales to Indians possessed "no sociological advantage." Brenda Ryan, "Provincial
Taxation and Indian Residents on a Reserve." (Unpublished Paper 1971).
187. R.S.C. 1970 c. E-13.
189. Id. § 2(1).
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organizations that as health, education, and social services con-
stitute a treaty obligation of the federal government, Section 88
bars the imposition of provincial sales taxes on Indians that are
designated as the "Education and Health Tax" in Saskatchewan,
the "Health Services Tax" in Nova Scotia, the "Social Services
Tax" in British Columbia, and the "Social Services and Educa-
tion Tax" in New Brunswick. The decisions of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal in R. v. Swimmer "' and R. v. Johnston' in
adopting a narrow interpretation of the terms of the treaties do
not suggest a great likelihood of success of such arguments.
Customs Duty
The federal Customs Tariff Act' imposes a duty on goods im-
ported into Canada in addition to that payable under the Excise
Tax Act. It provides no exemption for the personal property of
Indians and bands and none was recognized by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Francis v. The Queen." 2 A member of the
Saint Regis band of the Six Nations Indians in Quebec imported
household appliances for delivery to his home on the reserve
which bordered on the international boundary. The federal
government sought to levy taxes under the Customs Tariff Act
and the Excise Tax Act upon the importation of the items. Fran-
cis sought to rely upon Article III of the Treaty of Amity, Com-
merce and Navigation, between His Britannic Majesty and the
United States of America, signed on November 19, 1794, and
generally known as the Jay Treaty:
No Duty on Entry shall ever be levied by either Party on
Peltries brought by Land, or Inland Navigation into the said
Territories respectively, nor shall the Indians passing or repass-
ing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever
nature, pay for the same any Impost or Duty whatever. But
Goods in Bales or other large Packages unusual among Indians
shall not be considered as Goods belonging bona fide to In-
dians.
The provision was all that remained of the British proposal to
establish a neutral Indian buffer state between Canada and the
189. [1966] 56 W.W.R. 565 (Sask. C.A.).
190. [1971] 1 W.W.R. 756 (Sask. C.A.).
191. R.S.C. 1970 c. C-41.
192. [1956] S.C.R. 618.
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United States, and merely sought to protect the integrity of the
Six Nations Tribe on both sides of the international boundary. ,93
The exemption from duty was implemented in Lower Canada by
ordinance under an enabling act of 1796.194 The regulation lapsed
in 1813 .19S The provision was first implemented by statute in Up-
per Canada in 1801,196 and remained in force till it was repealed
in 1824.197 The exemption has not been implemented by statute or
ordinance anywhere in Canada since that time.
The Supreme Court of Canada declared that the exemption
could only take effect in the municipal law of Canada if im-
plemented by legislation or ordinance, and since there was no
such provision Francis could not rely upon the terms of the trea-
ty.'91 ' The Court unanimously concluded -that the taxes were
payable upon the appliances because "custom duties are not taxes
upon personal property of an Indian situated on a reserve but are
imposed upon the importation of goods into Canada"' 199 and are
accordingly not subject to the exemption of Section 87 of the In-
dian Act.
Counsel for Francis did argue that the movement of the ap-
pliances across the border directly onto the adjacent reserve con-
stituted the goods as "personal property situated on a reserve" at
the time of the levy. Such argument appears to be in accord with
the intent of the provision of the Jay Treaty in the protection of
the Six Nations Tribe located about the border. Without any in-
quiry as to the object of the treaty provision, Rand, J., rejected
the argument, observing: "On the argument made, the exemption
would be limited to situations in which that boundary bounded
also the reserve and could be a special indulgence to the small
fraction of Indians living on such reserve, a consequence which
itself appears to me to be a sufficient answer. 200
Indians frequently assert the protection of the Jay Treaty in
crossing the Canada-United States border. Administrative prac-
tice is difficult to determine, and perhaps is best described in the
193. BEMIS, JAY'S TRATY (1962).
194. 36 Geo. I1 (1796) c. 7.
195. 52 Geo. I1 (1812) c. 5.
196. 41 Geo. III (1801) c. 5 s. 6.
197. 4 Geo. IV (1824) c. 11.
198. Cameron, J., at trial [1954] Ex. C.R. 590, described the jurisprudence in the
United States at pp. 604-606.
199. [1956] S.C.R. 618, per Kerwin, C.J. (Taschereau and Fauteux, JJ., concurring).
200. Id.
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words of a taxation guide published by the Union of British Col-
umbia Indian Chiefs. 20 1
As a matter of fact, both before and after the Francis decision,
the Government had adopted a policy of not strictly enforcing
the customs laws against Indians. Occasionally, the govern-
ment will attempt to enforce them, which, as in 1968, pro-
duced a strong reaction from affected persons and renewed the
pressure on government to pass exempting legislation. It is im-
possible to say in what circumstances any Indian may, as a
matter of policy, be able to import certain kinds of property
without being required to pay duty.
Succession Duties and Estate Taxes
Section 87 of the Indian Act specifically denies liability to
"succession duty, inheritance tax or estate duty payable on the
death of any Indian in respect of" reserve lands or personal prop-
erty situate on a reserve. The exemption does not extend to prop-
erty of an Indian situate off a reserve. Only the province of
Quebec presently levies succession duty in Canada20 2; Ontario
repealed its tax in May, 1979,203 and the federal government
vacated the area in 1972.
Indian Band Power to Tax
Taxing power was first conferred upon band councils in 1884
in the Indian Advancement Act. 0 ' Its object was described in the
House of Commons by Sir John A. Macdonald:
[T]his Act is merely an experimental one, for the purpose of
enabling the Indians to do by an elective council what the
chiefs, by the Statute of 1880, have already the power to do. In
some of the tribes or bands, those chiefs are elected now, in
others the office is hereditary, and in other bands there is a
mixture of both systems. This Bill is to provide that in those
larger reserves where the Indians are more advanced in educa-
tion, and feel more self-confident, more willing to undertake
power and self-government, they shall elect their councils
201. Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, Nov. 1978, p. 73.
202. S.Q. 1978 c. 37.
203. S.O. 1979 c. 20.
204. S.C. 1880 c. 28.
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much the same as the whites do in the neighbouring
townships."'
The Act sought to establish a framework of municipal govern-
merit for the more "advanced" reserves. "0 6 The rationale appears
unaltered in Section 83 of the Indian Act today. The taxing
power conferred by that section may only be exercised "where
the Governor in Council declares that a band has reached an ad-
vanced stage of development" and are "subject to the approval
of the Minister." In conformity with the remarks of the Prime
Minister in 1884, it is difficult not to construe the powers con-
ferred as "municipal" in nature. The taxing powers extend to:
"(1)(a) the raising of money by (i) the assessment and taxation of
interests in land in the reserve of persons lawfully in possession
thereof, and (ii) the licensing of businesses, callings, trades and
occupations; ... "
The imposition of real property taxes is confined to "persons
lawfully in possession" of reserve lands. Such persons appear to
be those members of a band to whom "possession of the land has
been allotted... by the council of the band" in accordance with
Section 20(1) of the Indian Act. Section 20(1) declares that "no
Indian is lawfully in possession of land in a reserve" until such
allotment takes place and ministerial approval is granted. The
special usage of "lawfully in possession" as a reference to band
members to whom land has been allotted in such fashion is main-
tained throughout the Indian Act .20 Non-Indians may possess
land on a reserve by ministerial authorization, °0 permit,109 and
ministerial lease. 210 None of the provisions that allow such non-
Indian possession employ the expression "lawfully in posses-
sion," and it appears not to apply to such occupation. Such an
interpretation would delimit the band power to impose real prop-
erty taxation to the same degree that Indian and band interests are
exempt from municipal taxation. The matter is not free from
doubt and it has been suggested that the ordinary meaning of the
expression should be adopted so as not to limit the ambit of the
taxing power to Indians.2 1' The denial of the power to tax non-
205. H.C. Debates, Feb. 26, 1884.
206. See Bartlett, Indian Act of Canada, 27 BurnA.o L. ryEv. 581 (1978).
207. Sections 20, 22, 24, 25, 42, and 111.
208. Section 18(2).
209. Section 28(2).
210. Section 58.
211. D. Sanders, "Legal Aspects of Economic Development on Indian Reserve
Lands," Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1975.
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Indian property interests on a reserve bars valuable revenue to the
band in the economic development of a reserve and encourages
the imposition of provincial property taxes. Of perhaps greater
significance than the "municipal" property taxing and licensing
powers declared in Section 83(1)(a) is the power described in
83(1)(f), which was added by amendment in 1956212: "(f) the rais-
ing of money from band members to support land projects." No
explanation for the amendment is evident in the debates in Parlia-
ment or the Annual Report of the Indian Affairs Branch. The
section would seem to permit the imposition of any form of tax,
including, of course, income tax, upon band members by the
band council. It represents a marked deviation from the
municipal model of taxation.
The significance of the taxing power declared in Section 83 is
illusory insofar as the ambit is as yet untested and its potential
unrealized. In 1975 it was observed: "While some bands have
been designated as having reached an advanced state of develop-
ment only two bands in Canada have considered enacting taxing
by-laws and apparently no band presently has a taxing by-law in
force. ' 213
As Section 87 makes clear, the exemption therein declared is
"subject to section 83" and thus would not be effective to
preclude a band council imposing a full range of taxes upon its
members in the furtherance of self-government and economic
development. The introduction of taxing bylaws under Section 83
would be effective, however, to bar the imposition of provincial
taxes upon reserve interests if "such laws are inconsistent ' 2 1
with the bylaw. If the imposition of income taxation or the taxation
of non-Indian property interests upon reserves was considered a
valid exercise of power within Section 83, such inconsistency may
be denied in accordance with the constitutional principle that
"two taxations... can stand side by side without interfering." ' 2"s
It is suggested that such principle may be inapplicable in the
determination of the extent to which band council bylaws may ex-
clude provincial taxing legislation. The context of the Indian Act
does not suggest or require anything other than the ordinary
meaning of "inconsistent," and municipal real property taxation
212. S.C. 1956 c. 40 s. 21.
213. Sanders, supra note 212. See also Taxation Workshop Minutes, 1978, Edmon-
ton, Alberta, National Indian Brotherhood.
214. Section 88, Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970 c. 1-6.
215. Lachine v. Montreal Light, Heat & Power (1932) 70 Que. S.C.; 442 Re Silver
Bros. 11932] A.C. 514 per Viscount Dunedin.
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of non-Indians upon a reserve already imposing taxation upon
such interests surely creates an "inconsistency."
Conclusion
The exemption from taxation of Indians and Indian bands was
first declared by legislation in treaty negotiations in the nine-
teenth century. The exemption was directed to protecting the In-
dian people until their integration into Canadian society. The
Hawthorne Committee21 ' reported a century later that "integra-
tion or assimilation are not objectives which anyone else can pro-
perly hold for the Indian. The effort of the Indian Affairs Branch
should be concentrated on a series of specific middle range objec-
tives, such as increasing their real income, and adding to their life
expectancy."
If integration is no longer an appropriate objective, economic
development of reserves clearly is. In 1975 the Federation of
Saskatchewan Indians estimated that 72 percent of the Saskat-
chewan Indian population were unemployed compared with 3.5
percent of the non-Indian population.21 7 The average annual
wage of the Indian population was calculated as $1,530 compared
with $9,997 of the non-Indian population. The exemption from
taxation affords a valuable incentive to the economic develop-
ment of reserve lands. Manipulation of the tax base has, of
course, commonly been used to further and control economic
development in other areas. In respect of- Indians and Indian
reserve lands, a proper recognition of the exemption would not
only achieve such object but would enable the Crown to keep
faith with the assurances of the Treaty Commissioner and of
Prime Minister Macdonald a century ago. The present language
of the exemption is readily capable of such a construction, so as
to deny the imposition of all forms of federal and provincial taxa-
tion upon reserves and Indians thereon.
Such exemption would, it is hoped, be complemented by the
expansion of the jurisdiction of band councils so as to enable the
taxation of non-Indians occupying or doing business upon a.
reserve. The amendment of Section 83 of the Indian Act in con-
216. Indian Affairs Branch, Hawthorne Comm., Survey of Contemporary Indians of
Canada (Ottawa 1966).
217. Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, Profile of Saskatchewan Indians, 1975. See
also Submission of Saskatchewan to Joint Committee of Senate and Commons, June 12,
1960.
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junction with a purposive construction of the exemption in Sec-
tion 87 would accord with the counsel of George Manuel, former
president of the National Indian Brotherhood and founder of the
World Council of Indigenous Peoples: "[Ihe fastest way to bring
about change among an oppressed people is to put the decision
making authority and the economic resources that go with it, into
their own hands.1 21
8
218. G. MANUEL, THE FouRTH WORLD, AN INDIAN REALrry 246 (1974).
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